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Abstract
As of 1989 more than one-fifth of the nation's 
federally insured saving and loans institutions have 
negative net worth. Very little is known, however, about 
their pricing behavior of financial assets. Host of the 
existing literature has focused on whether insolvent 
institutions bid up their cost of funds. The asset pricing 
issue of insolvent institutions has not been examined in the 
mortgage literature. This dissertation extends the 
literature by examining whether failed or failing saving and 
loan institutions offer their conventional fixed- and 
adjustable-rate mortgages at a discount relative to solvent 
institutions. A theoretical argument for the underpricing 
proposition is presented based on the premises that 
insolvent lending institution use the conditional repayment 
probability and do not consider capital losses due to an 
adverse shift in interest rates in setting credit rates. 
Therefore, insolvent lending institutions will tend to offer 
lower contractual interest rates on mortgages than well- 
capitalized institutions. Using a national data set three 
empirical tests are performed: a Chow test, a Goldfeld and 
Quandt test, and the Tishler and Zang maximum likelihood 
optimization technique. The results show that failed or 
failing saving and loans institutions do, indeed, offer 
their conventional fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgages at a 
discount relative to healthy lending institutions.
x
Failed or Failing Landing Institutions Behavior and Implications for the Pricing of Mortgages
chapter I 
introduction
Over the past few years the unsuccessful attempts to 
contain the escalating problems in the saving and loans 
industry have led to alarming headlines in the financial 
press about lending institutions failures, buyouts, and 
forced mergers. Also, there are dismal predictions of the 
imminent collapse of the entire thrift industry. Many 
thrifts— approximately one-fifth of all federally insured 
thrift institutions— are negative-net-worth institutions 
that are being gradually closed.
Very little is known about the pricing behavior of 
these failed or failing lending institutions, in spite of 
the fact that more than 200 lending institutions failed 
during the 1986 to 1989 period and about 400 of the nation's 
3000 federally insured saving and loans institutions are 
currently insolvent. Most of the existing literature in 
this area has focused on whether failed or failing 
institutions bid up their cost of funds. The issue of 
underpricing by these failed or failing institutions is not 
currently examined in the mortgage pricing literature.
1
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In light of this gap, this dissertation attempts to 
extend the literature by examining whether failed or failing 
lending institutions underprice their mortgage products. It 
is argued that insolvent thrift institutions will 
systematically underbid their products by offering mortgage 
loans at a discount. Implications from a simple theoretical 
model are analyzed with respect to the pricing of 
conventional mortgage loans using data obtained from the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) monthly interest rate 
survey. The remainder of this dissertation is structured as 
follows.
In chapter II, a brief review of the extant literature 
on disparities in the mortgage pricing behavior of lending 
institutions is presented. In particular, regional 
variation in mortgage yields and differences in lending 
practices among financial institutions are discussed. This 
chapter also briefly reviews the evidence on well- 
capitalized lending institutions in the presence of 
federally deposit insurance programs and whether failed or 
failing lending institutions bid up their cost of funds.
The ability of lending institutions to bid up their cost of 
funds is due, in part, to the existence of a flat-rate 
deposit insurance premium.
Chapter III examines the pricing of fixed and 
adjustable-rate mortgages. The chapter starts out with a 
contingent-claims model of fixed-rate mortgages and
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illustrates the pricing implications for insolvent 
institutions when the assumption regarding the conditional 
probability of remaining solvent is relaxed. This chapter 
argues that failed or failing institutions may price their 
fixed-rate mortgage loan products at a lower rate than well- 
capitalized lending institutions. This argument is based on 
the premise that well-capitalized lending institutions will 
worry about the conditional probability that the institution 
will remain solvent when pricing their mortgage products.
On the other hand, failed or failing lending institutions 
that may have only a small chance of regaining solvency in 
the future period will not care about borrower defaults. It 
is further showed that insolvent institutions may also 
underprice the interest rate risks. Their ability to do so 
is to a large extent is due to the unsymmetrical nature of 
their capital gain and loss functions. All of the capital 
gains from a favorable shift in the term structure of 
interest rates accrue to the institutions while most of the 
capital losses are of no consequences to their already 
insolvent conditions. Therefore, these insolvent 
institutions can underprice their loan products by offering 
fixed-rate mortgages at a discount relative to the healthy 
lending institutions.
The same argument can also be made for adjustable rate 
mortgages. Insolvent institutions may offer adjustable-rate 
mortgages at a discount in order to encourage or allow
continued borrowing. Moreover, because adjustable-rate 
mortgage borrowers are better off with lower points, tighter 
caps, or greater teaser rates, failed or failing lending 
institutions may offer adjustable-rate mortgages with fairly 
large teaser rates, tighter interest-rate caps, or lower 
discount points.
The differential pricing mechanism between solvent and 
insolvent lending institutions is further illustrated in 
appendix A with a simple model. It is argued that since the 
failed or failing lending institution uses the conditional 
repayment probability in setting credit rates, it will use a 
higher repayment probability than a solvent lending 
institution. As the result, the failed or failing lending 
institution will rationally offer a lower contractual 
interest rate on mortgages than would a well-capitalized 
lending institution making the same loan.
Chapter IV presents three estimation techniques to test 
whether failed or failing institutions systematically 
underbid their mortgage loans. In particular, the Chow, the 
Goldfeld and Quandt, and the Tishler and Zang estimation 
techniques are described. These three approaches will be 
used to test for the underpricing of fixed-and adjustable- 
rate mortgages
The empirical testings and results are then presented 
in Chapters V and VI. The three estimation techniques 
described in the previous chapter are applied to the pricing
of fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable-rate mortgages 
(ARMs). The chapters start with the pricing estimation of 
FRMs and ARMs respectively and end with the analysis and 
discussion of results. The results are consistent with the 
theory section. That is, failed or failing institutions do 
underprice their mortgage loans. And finally, Chapter VII 
will conclude the dissertation.
Chapter II
Literature Review
Mortgage pricing is one area of security valuation 
theory that has received a great deal of attention in recent 
years. Empirical studies are accumulating rapidly and, at 
the same time, important developments in the theoretical 
pricing of mortgage instruments are taking place. As yet, 
however, there is very little known about the institutional 
disparities in mortgage pricing and, more specifically, 
whether failed or failing lending institutions 
systematically underprice their mortgage loan products.
Most econometric tests of differences in lending behavior 
have focused instead on whether failed or failing lending 
institutions bid up their cost of funds.
This chapter will review the extant literature on 
mortgage pricing. Included in this brief literature review 
is a survey of the theoretical and empirical studies dealing 
with regional variation in mortgage pricing and differences 
in lending behavior among financial institution. A summary 
concludes this chapter.
2.1. Variations in Mortgage Pricing
Variations in mortgage rates across time have 
traditionally been related to two variables: interest-rate
uncertainty and default risk. Mortgage rates should 
increase with interest-rate uncertainty since mortgage
6
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borrowers generally have the option to terminate the 
mortgage at their discretion. Exercise of this option is 
typically motivated by a desire to reduce borrowing costs 
and will systematically reduce the lending institution's 
yield by the same amount. This is not a risk of loss or 
uncertainty, but has a measurable expected loss for which 
lending institutions must be compensated.
Formal models for the pricing of interest-rate 
uncertainty in mortgages are presented by Dunn and McConnell 
(1981), Buser and Hendershott (1984), Cunningham and 
Hendershott (1984) and Brennan and Schwartz (1985). For 
most of these models, interest rates are assumed to depend, 
as in Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985), on the instantaneous 
spot rate. The change in the spot rate is modelled in 
continuous time as an Ito's diffusion process. Interest- 
rate uncertainty is then explicitly introduced in these 
models by viewing a default-free assumable fixed-rate 
mortgage loans as a call option on the continuous annuity 
payments.1 In equilibrium, the value of the borrower's 
call option is assumed to be a function of the coupon rate, 
the term to maturity, the interest rate structure, and other
^n light of these similarities, much of the pricing 
models of mortgages are based on the option pricing literature 
which was originally developed by Black and Scholes (1973); 
Merton (1973); Brennan and Schwartz (1977); and Cox, Ingersoll 
and Ross (1985). Most of the mortgage pricing models do not 
provide a closed analytical form solution with the exception 
of Leung's (1987) model of a defsuitable mortgage. Therefore, 
these models have to be solved by numerical methods.
8
characteristics of the contract. Mortgage pricing models, 
in general, use the principle of arbitrage or zero arbitrage 
profits to determine the equilibrium mortgage prices. The 
ability to form a risk free portfolio gives these models a 
basic equilibrium condition of a risk free return on a 
synthetic portfolio. Using this notion of no arbitrage, the 
instantaneously riskless portfolio is formed by combining a 
long position in the mortgage with a short position in 
treasury bills, which results in a zero instantaneous 
return. This in turn enables mortgage pricing models to 
prove that the instantaneous mortgage yield is equal to risk 
free rate plus a premium.
Dunn and McConnell (1981) were the first to use 
contingent-claims bond pricing models of Brennan and 
Schwartz (1977) and the general equilibrium results of Cox, 
Ingersoll, and Ross (1976, 1985) to value mortgages. Their 
model assumes that the stochastic behavior of short term 
rates will determine long term rates and that the 
instantaneous riskless rate of interest follows a mean- 
reverting stochastic process. They use these assumptions to 
examine the effect of interest rate uncertainty on the value 
of GNMA mortgage-backed securities.2
The major difference between the Dunn and McConnell 
model and other models of mortgage valuation is they utilize
2 Dunn and McConnell (1981) ignore default risk since 
GNMA securities are default-free securities composed entirely 
of pools of FHA- and VA-insured loans.
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a Poisson-driven process to model the possibility of optimal 
and suboptima1 mortgage prepayments. Optimal mortgage 
prepayments describe the situation when the value of the 
outstanding mortgage balance is less than the current value 
of the loan; that is, these prepayments occur only whenever 
the market interest rate falls below the contract rate of 
the mortgage, so that the existing debt can be refinanced 
with a lower rate. Suboptimal mortgage prepayments are made 
when the market interest rate is higher than the contract 
rate and usually occur owning to events such as divorce or 
relocation. To model these two types of prepayments, Dunn 
and McConnell were forced to examine a non-amortizing 
callable mortgage.
Buser and Hendershott (1984) expand the model of Dunn 
and McConnell (1981) to examine the effect of different 
parameter values on the value of the prepayment option and 
the value of a non-defaultable mortgage. In particular, 
Buser and Hendershott include the cost of refinancing in 
their model (instead of assuming no refinancing costs as in 
Dunn and McConnell's model) to examine its impact on a 
prepayable mortgage. In Buser and Hendershott's model, the 
term structure of interest rate is the only state variable 
that governs the value of a fixed rate loan. They find that 
the relative values of the call option on 30- and 15-year 
fixed-rate mortgages and graduated-payment mortgages to be 
reasonably robust with respect to specifications of the
10
Interest-rate process. For the 1970s, Buser and Hendershott 
report the initial spread over Treasury yields ranged from 
90 basis points to 350 basis points; higher values are found 
for the 1980s.
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) developed a two-state 
partial differential equation to value default-free GNMA 
mortgages. Their model uses the instantaneously risk-free 
rate and the yield on a consol bond as state variables.
Using the no arbitrage argument to form an instantaneous 
risk free portfolio, Brennan and Schwartz were able to 
derive pricing equations for default-free mortgages subject 
to both short and long-term interest rates. Brennan and 
Schwartz, however, do not differentiate between suboptimal 
and optimal prepayments. Nevertheless, they were able to 
show that their fundamental valuation equation is equivalent 
to a valuation equation for an option on coupon-paying 
security, as developed by Black-Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1973), when the instantaneous risk-free rate is constant.
Cunningham and Hendershott (1984) were the first to 
examine the effect of default risk on mortgage values in a 
contingent-claims pricing framework. Their model assumes 
that house prices are the only source of uncertainty in 
mortgage valuation. They model this uncertainty by assuming 
a non-stochastic interest-rate environment and by making the 
simplifying assumption that house prices follow a log-normal 
distributed process. They assume that default only occurs
11
if the price of the house falls below the level at which the 
gains from defaulting on the mortgage is larger than the 
costs of doing so. The costs of default include relocating 
costs (such as possible damages to credit rating), whereas 
the benefits from defaulting are the recapture of negative 
equity in the mortgaged house plus free rental services. 
Cunningham and Hendershott assume that the free rent between 
the date when the borrower is declared in default and the 
date when the property is sold at a foreclosure sale is 
equal to ten percent of the value of the house at the time 
of default, and that the costs from defaulting are between 
fifteen to thirty percent of the house. Cunningham and 
Hendershott use their model to price default risk and 
insurance for FHA mortgages. They found only a small costs 
associated with default. For example, for an 80% loan-to- 
value ratio mortgage, a risk premium of 5 to 15 basis points 
in the loan rate is charged when the standard deviation of 
house price changes is around 5% per annum.
The effect of default risk on mortgage yields is also 
analyzed by Masulis (1982), Epperson, ££ fii. (1985) and Kau,
(1986,1989). These studies generally assume that 
borrower defaults will occur when the recapture of negative 
equity (i.e., the value of the mortgage less house value) 
and the free rent earned between default and foreclosure 
exceed the costs of default. The Masulis (1982) study, for 
example, examines the market value of real estate to model
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the equity claim in a mortgage as a European option with a 
lump-sum exercise price. Xn this framework, the equity 
claim on a house is viewed as a call option to buy the house 
back from the mortgage lender at the time of maturity for a 
price equal to the principal plus interest.
The studies of Epperson, fijfc al- (1985) and Kau, al.
(1986,1989) assume that borrowers will exercise the option 
to default at the date of a payment and only if the house 
price is less than the mortgage outstanding balance. They 
find that default options are significant and sensitive to 
changes in the term structure of interest rates. In 
addition, default risk may also vary cross-sectioning across 
region.
Across regions, mortgage rates on equal-sized mortgage 
loans collateralized by equal-valued houses should vary 
because of potential differences in expected losses from 
default. These regional differences are generally thought 
to arise owing to differences in expected house price 
inflation/volatility and/or in state foreclosure laws. 
Numerous studies have examined regional disparities in 
mortgage interest rates (e.g. Furstensberg (1970), Heador 
(1978), Zabrinski, Barth and Harlow (1982) and Horrell and 
Saba (1983)). For example, Zabrinski, Barth and Harlow 
report an average differential in mortgage across regions to 
be around one hundred basis points. They find that these 
differences in mortgage lending rates across regions can be
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explained by such factors as legal barriers, variation in 
market risks, and the heterogeneous nature of mortgage 
instruments. In addition, Morrell and Saba (1983) find that 
regional differences in mortgage yields depend on secondary 
mortgage market activity and mortgage standardization.
2.2. Institutional Disparities in Mortgage Pricing
The theory suggests that institutional disparities in 
mortgage yields may exist when the demand for mortgage 
credit facing an individual lender is downward sloping 
relative to interest rates or when borrowers lack perfect 
information. Either event could lead to differences in 
average rates charged borrowers at savings and loan 
associations (S&Ls) relative to interest rates. This 
relative difference in mortgage yields may depend on such 
factors as the availability of S&L investable funds or on 
origination costs. In general, the effective rate on 
conventional mortgage loans should equal the regional cost 
of funds to the lender plus a differential that varies with 
the characteristics of the borrower and of the loan 
contract.
Very little evidence on institutional disparities in 
mortgage yields exists. The major exception is the study by 
Heuson (1989). Heuson examines the disparity in pricing of 
adjustable-rate loans across commercial banks and savings 
and loan associations. The results of her study suggest
14
that initial period discounts or "teasers" on adjustable- 
rate mortgages are not identical across lender type. Heuson 
finds that commercial banks, in general, offer larger 
teasers than thrift institutions. There is no hard evidence 
on whether or not failed or failing lending institutions 
underprice their mortgage products.
Host of the empirical evidence on the pricing behavior 
of insolvent institutions has focused on whether failed or 
failing lending institutions bid up their costs of funds. 
Several studies (e.g. Kane (1982,1984), Benston and Kaufman 
(1986) and Kim and Santomero (1988)) suggest that insolvent 
thrifts, to a large extent, are able to bid up the cost of 
funds because of the fixed premium deposit insurance 
system.3 Their argument is that deposit insurance gives 
failed or failing lending institutions an added incentive to 
bear excessive risks, which can potentially increase their 
profit at the expense of the insurer and perhaps uninsured 
depositors. By taking on extremely high levels of risk, 
failed or failing lending institution can in turn bid-up the 
cost of funds in order to attract deposits. All of the
3The federal insurance programs were established by the 
Banking Acts in the 1930s in response to serious deterioration 
in the financial market brought about by the Great Depression. 
Indeed, the rationale for deposit insurance is sound. It's 
based on the notion of maintaining economic efficiency. The 
losses associated with failure may be expected to influence 
the behavior of market participants, especially for thrift 
institutions since they provide the bulk of our money supply. 
Large scale failure may lead to economic depressions and can 
potentially bring down the entire financial system.
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gains from this lending strategy accrue to the owners and 
managers of the lending institution, while the losses accrue 
to the insurer.4
Depositors under this scenario operate with a high 
degree of confidence, since deposit insurance, in essence, 
eliminates the risk of loss, thereby reducing the high costs 
of information and surveillance associated with failed or 
failing lending institutions.5 Also, because of the 
protection that deposit insurance offers, depositors have no 
need to withdraw funds from problem institutions, making 
runs on the banking system highly unlikely (see, for 
example, Kane (1983,1985) and Benton (1983)).
Deposit insurance also creates moral hazard problems, 
in which lending institutions with more information than the 
federally deposit insurance agencies may manage their assets 
in such a way so as to increase overall risk. It is both 
implausible and potentially misleading to assume that the
*The works of Merton (1977) and Sharpe (1978) and
Brickley and James (1986) make substantial contributions. 
These authors show that providing deposit guarantees at less 
than their market value provides depository institutions with 
a subsidy. However, Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) argue that 
the explicit premium that the federal depository insurance 
agencies charges is deliberately underpriced, and capital 
adequacy and other regulations serve as an additional implicit 
premium.
Merton (1978) shows that the surveillance cost component 
of deposit insurance premium is, in effect, paid for by the
depositor. Government guarantees for deposits can be provided
because there exists economies of scale in information and 
monitoring costs in large scale insurance to the S&L
institutions.
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public insuring agency has the same information as the 
lending institution concerning the quality of the 
institution's asset, since the lending institution normally 
has superior information concerning its assets.6
Furthermore, with the increasing popularity in asset 
securitization activities, lending institutions can 
potentially alter their riskiness by issuing mortgage-backed 
securities (Pavel and Phillis (1987)). However, there is 
potential adverse selection problem due to Akerlof's (1970) 
"lemons" principle where lending institutions only sell 
assets with higher risks than their normally would retain 
for their own portfolios (Jaffee and Rosen (1988)).
Thereby, lending institutions may potentially be able to 
shift risks to the investors of mortgage-backed securities. 
In addition, the failed or failing lending institution can
6A pricing policy that ignores this information asymmetry 
is likely to provide depository institutions with similar 
risk-taking incentives that is associated with the current 
risk-insensitive pricing arrangement. Kane (1983) appreciates 
this aspect of the problem. He argues for a "redesigned" 
insurance system that would provide incentives to the 
institutions to truthfully reveal the necessary information 
and thereby facilitate the efficient pricing of risk shifted 
to the public insurer. A variety of pricing policies that 
involve a thrift's choice of capital or asset/liability 
composition could be designed to elicit the needed 
information. Theoretically, it is a sound concept, however, 
the implementation of such policies will be infeasible, as it 
calls for accurately quantifying the riskiness of each insured 
institution in terms of observable and realistic data. In the 
absence of such quantification, the federal insurance 
agencies' role would become necessarily judgmental, running 
counter to the very spirit that deregulation seeks to foster.
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generate fee Income from originating mortgage loans that are 
sold and by then servicing those loans.
Since the solvency status of a lending institution is 
largely dependent upon its capital-to-asset ratio, which is, 
in part, regulated by the depository insurance agencies, the 
thrift has every incentive to improve this regulated 
constraint.7 For failed or failing institutions, this 
issue becomes even more critical. Their survivability 
depends not only on whether or not they can improve the 
capital-to-asset ratio, but also on how fast they are able 
to do it. To become solvent again is to prevent the 
regulator from closing them down. It is these problem 
thrift institutions, which are in desperate need to quickly 
generate cash, that are thought to be underbidding their 
products, primarily FRMs and ARMs, and bidding up their cost 
of funds. And as previously argued, most existing 
literature has focussed on the later issue, none have 
addressed the underpricing behavior of failed or failing 
institutions.
2.3 conclusion
7The ultimate purpose of a capital adequacy is to 
explicitly protect, preserve and promote the soundness of 
depository institutional system. The standard is imposed, in 
part, to insure that an adequate surplus exists protecting 
depositors from losing their funds. The minimum capital 
requirement potentially reduces the probability of insolvency. 
Theoretically, the higher the capitalization, the less risk 
depositors must assume ceteris paribus.
18
This chapter provides a brief review of the extant 
literature on disparities on the mortgage pricing behavior 
of lending institutions. In particular, regional variation 
in mortgage yields and differences in lending practices 
among financial institutions are discussed. This chapter 
also briefly reviews the evidence on well-capitalized 
lending institutions in the presence of federal deposit 
insurance programs and whether failed or failing lending 
institutions bid up their cost of funds. The ability for 
lending institutions to bid-up their cost of funds is due, 
in part, to the existence of a flat-rate deposit insurance 
premium. The issue of underpricing by these failed or 
failing institutions is not currently examined in the 
mortgage pricing literature. In light of this gap, this 
dissertation attempts to extend the literature by examining 
the issue of mortgage underpricing as it applies to failed 
or failing lending institutions.
Chapter ill
Theory
Normally, a well-capitalized lender will price its 
mortgage products (i.e., fixed and/or adjustable- ate 
mortgages) based on the conditional probability that the 
lending institution will remain solvent. Since these 
institutions have positive equity capital at risk, they will 
be concerned about the various contingent claims on a 
mortgage, such as prepayment and default.
Failed or failing financial institutions, however, may 
not care about borrowers' defaults, especially if there is a 
small chance that the institution will regain solvency 
should defaults or adverse prepayments occur. Insolvent 
institutions that will probably go under anyway may favor 
risky mortgage loans over safe ones, and be tempted to 
underprice their mortgage loan products to get a large 
return should these mortgage loans actually pay off. 
Furthermore, insolvent savings and loan institutions can 
also underbid their loans by underpricing the interest rate 
risks. It is a no loss proposition for insolvent thrift 
institutions to bear excessive interest rate risks. Unlike 
well-capitalized institutions, gain and loss functions for 
insolvent institutions are unsymmetrical and are bounded 
from below. All of the gains from this lending strategy 
accrue to the owners and managers of the lending
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institutions, while any additional loss is inconsequential 
to the institutions given their current insolventcy 
conditions. This warped strategy for originating mortgage 
loans is clearly costly to taxpayers and to the economy as a 
whole. Financial managers of failed or failing lending 
institutions who act strictly in their shareholders' 
interests (and against the interests of debt holders and 
federal deposit insurers) may offer mortgage borrowers loans 
at reduced or "below-market" interest rates.
This chapter examines the pricing implications of 
fixed-and adjustable-rate mortgages originated by failed or 
failing institutions. The chapter starts out with a 
contingent-claims model of fixed-rate mortgages and 
illustrates the pricing implications for insolvent 
institutions when the assumptions regarding the conditional 
probability of remaining solvent and the intersest rate 
related capital loss are relaxed. Finally, the pricing of 
adjustable-rate mortgages is discussed.
3.1 Pricing Practices of Failed or Failing Institutions:
The Case of Fixed-Rate Mortgages.
Several implicit assumptions are conveniently 
overlooked when developing pricing models of fixed-rate 
mortgages.8 One such assumption is the premise that the
BContingent-claims Pricing models of fixed-rate mortgages 
are developed by Dunn and McConnell (1981), Cunningham and 
Hendershott (1984) and Kau, et al. (1986). For an excellent 
summary of this literature, see Hendershott and Van Order 
(1987).
21
lending institution is solvent and will remain solvent. 
Relaxing this assumption, it can be shown that failed or 
failing lending institutions will have a natural incentive 
to underprice their mortgage loan products. While such a 
pricing behavior is good for recipients of these low 
mortgage rates, it is generally bad for other households and 
well-capitalized mortgage lenders. It is argued that 
insolvent institutions may underprice their fixed-rate 
mortages by either underpricing default risks and interest 
rate risks.
3.1.1 Underpricing of Default risk
To illustrate the pricing behavior of failed or 
failing financial institutions, consider a contingent-claims 
model of fixed-rate mortgages assuming the conditional 
probability of the thrift being solvent is non-negative.
Most contingent-claims pricing models of fixed-rate 
mortgages implicitly assume that capital markets and the 
market for real estate are perfect (see, for example, Kau, 
Keenan, Muller and Epperson (1986, 1989); and Titman and 
Torous (1986)). These models also implicitly assume that 
borrowers are wealth maximizers, utilizing an optimal call 
strategy in deciding whether or not to terminate the 
mortgage prematurely.
Most contingent-claims pricing models assume that 
mortgage borrowers have two options, the option to terminate
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(i.e. either refinance or allow a buyer of the property to 
assume) the mortgage at their discretion, and the option to 
default. The option to repay or assume an existing mortgage 
allows borrowers to refinance if interest rates decline or 
let a new buyer assume an existing low rate mortgage ("put" 
it back in the lender's portfolio) if interest rates rise. 
This option reduces the costs of possible future 
relocation.9
Host contingent-claims pricing models also assume that 
expected default losses on mortgages depend on the 
likelihood of default and the expected losses associated 
with its occurrence. The argument is that a mortgage 
borrower will default on the debt if the gains from doing so 
(i.e., the recapture of negative equity in the house and the 
free rent that can be obtained between the time of default 
and actual foreclosure) exceed the direct and indirect costs 
(i.e., the dollar and psychic costs of moving, loss of 
attachable assets, and loss of credit rating). Under these 
conditions, a solvent or well-capitalized lender may 
conceivably require a slight risk premium to compensate for 
aversion to these expected losses. Furthermore, solvent or 
well-capitalized lenders may also require a higher coupon
9Borrowers may also terminate the mortgage owing to such 
events as the sale of the property and the move to a new home, 
the changing of jobs, etc. These events are generally not of 
concern to investors because such mortgage refinancing or 
assumptions are unsystematic and thus are as likely to raise 
investor yields as to reduce them.
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rate to offset the lower servicing value owing to greater 
expected default.
These observations suggest that solvent or well- 
capitalized lenders will be concerned about two sources of 
uncertainty in mortgages: the term structure of interest 
rates and the housing price. To model this, let r be the 
instantaneous risk-free interest rate, and H represent the 
value of the house. Also assume that the spot rate of 
interest, r, follows a mean reverting square root diffusion 
process:
dr = b(m-r)dt + orfr dzr (1)
where
b = speed of adjustment coefficient of the
current interest rate to its long run mean 
m = long-term mean for r 
or = instantaneous standard deviation and 
zr = standardized Wiener process
Note that the functional form of the mean reverting interest 
rate stochastic process in equation (1) excludes the 
possibility of negative interest rates a priori.
Further, assume that the local expectation hypothesis 





B(t,T) - value of a pure discount bond at time t 
paying one dollar at time T 
r(t) = spot rate at time t
One of the advantages in invoking the local expectation 
hypothesis is that there are no risk premia in the term 
structure. Since the market price of risk is zero, there is 
no need to make any assumptions about investor preferences 
in determining the fundamental valuation equation. In this 
case, all riskless securities will earn the current 
instantaneous riskless rate, r, which is the rate of return 
over the shortest time interval, dt. Furthermore, the local 
expectation hypothesis implies that the spot rate, r(t), in 
the term structure summarizes all information at time t the 
lending institution needs to know about future interest 
rates. Hence, a single state variable is needed to 
represent the term structure of interest rates.10 Also, it 
is assumed that the variance of the process increases 
proportionally with the interest rate.
10Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1981) discuss in depth the 
local expectation hypothesis and prove that only the local 
expectation hypothesis is consistent with a general 
equilibrium in continuous time.
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The other source of uncertainty 1b the house price.
The value of the house, H, is assumed to follow a lognormal 
diffusion process. The expected return on the house is 
composed of two parts: the service flow or expected 
dividends from using the property over time and the capital 
reversion on the house. The stochastic process representing 
house prices is described by the following equation:
dH = (h - s) Hdt + oH HdzH (3)
where
h = instantaneous expected return on house 
s = continuous rate of service flow of house 
oH = instantaneous standard deviation 
zH = standardized Wiener process
The service flow from the house, sHdt, is assumed to be 
proportional to the house price. The term (h~s) represents 
the expected rate of equity reversion on the property and is 
assumed to be lognormally distributed.
The lognormality of the distribution of housing prices 
gives the mortgage model some plausible properties. First 
of all, negative house prices are excluded from the model. 
Secondly, when the level of house prices increases, the 
variance of the change in housing prices will also increase.
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And finally, as the house price approaches zero, so does the 
market value of the mortgage.
It is also assumed that the unexpected changes in the 
house value are correlated with unanticipated changes in the 
instantaneous spot rate
dzr(t) dzH(t) = pdt (4)
where p denotes the instantaneous correlation coefficient 
between the changes in interest rates and the level of 
housing prices.
Given these assumptions, the instantaneous level of 
housing prices, the current instantaneously riskless rate of 
interest, and the time to maturity completely summarize all 
of the information needed to determine the price of a 
mortgage. The value of the mortgage can be obtained by 
applying Ito*s lemma:11
11Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that the 
values of the riskless bond, the house, and the mortgage, are 
all linear functions of only two state variables, a riskless 
portfolio can be formed by combining these assets. It is also 
assumed that the interest rate risk of the mortgage can be 
hedged with a short position in the riskless bond and that the 
risk associating with changes in the value of the house can be 
hedged with short positions in the property. Since there is 
no arbitrage opportunities, the return on the riskless 
portfolio must be equal to risk free rate of interest* Using 
the hedging arguments as in Black and Scholes (1973) or Cox, 
Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a), it is possible to determine a 
fundamental partial differential equation for the value of the 
mortgage.
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h a 2H2 (82V/3H2) + pH/rCThar (82V/ (8Hdr))
+ h r o f i d t y / d x 2) + b(m-r) (3v/8r)
+ (r-s)H(3v/3H) + 3v/3t - rV + r =0 (5)
Equation (5) suggests that the expected instantaneous 
mortgage value is composed of two sources of value: the
payout function describing the payment stream of the 
mortgage, r, and the expected gains due to changes in time, 
t, and state variables, H and r. The dV/dt term in (5) 
represents the change in the value of the mortgage with 
respect to time. The b(m-r)(3v/3r) term in (5) is the 
expected change in the interest rate multiplied by the 
sensitivity of the mortgage value to interest rate, where 
the expected value gain owing to the stochastic nature of r 
is given by h r a ^ i d ^ / d x 2). This implies that this expected 
gain in value depends on the volatility of the spot rate and 
the shape of the mortgage value function. Similarly, (r- 
s)H(3V/3H) and f̂fhzH2 (32V/3h2) represent the expected change 
in mortgage value from the sensitivity to and stochastic 
dispersion in housing prices. Finally, the term 
pH/rahar(32V/(8H3r)) in the fundamental partial differential 
equation is the gain in mortgage value as the result of 
covariations in housing prices and interest rates. Figure 
3.1 represents the value of the mortgage at a given time as 
a function of house prices. The value of the default option 
is the difference between the value of a default-free and a
defaultable mortgage. The option is optimally exercised 
along the 45°-degree line.
Proposition: Failed or failing lending
institutions will underbid their mortgage products 
by an amount equal to /x = F*(0) (1-r,) (l-F“(/5) )_1 
Proof. Proof of this proposition rests on the simple 
realization that failed or failing lending institutions are 
not concerned with the default option by the borrower.
Since insolvent lending institutions probably will go under 
anyway should borrowers default, they will instead favor 
risky mortgages over safe ones. The formal proof of this 
proposition is contained in appendix A, QED.
This suggests that the state variable governing house 
price dynamics is no longer needed, hence equation (5) can 
be simplified to:
ho2r(a2V/3r2) + b(m-r) (dv/dr)
+ av/at - rv + r = o (6)
A comparison of equations (5) and (6) suggests that a 
failed or failing lending institution will discount their 
mortgage products by the value of the default option. The 
magnitude of this discount can easily be seen by examining 
Tables 3.1-3.4. Table 3.1 shows the value of a fixed-rate 
mortgage with default and prepayment options at various 
loan-to-value and volatility ratios, while Table 3.2 shows
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the value of a default-free fixed-rate mortgage. These 








with appropriate boundary and initial conditions, (see 
appendix B for more details) and are identical to those 
reported in Kau, et al. (1986). The differences between the 
value of a mortgage with default and prepayment option and 
the value of a non-defaultable mortgage are reported in 
Table 3. Table 4 gives the value of the default options in 
term of basis points which vary significantly between 0 to 
320 basis points. Failed or failing may, therefore, 
underbid their mortgages since they do not account for 
default risk in pricing mortgage loans.
In addition to underpricing of borrowers' default, 
insolvent institutions may also underbid their fixed-rate 
mortgages by underpricing interest rate risks.
3.1.2 Underpricing of Interest Rate Risk
Unlike well-capitalized lending institutions, insolvent 
savings and loan associations have unsymmetrical boundary
conditions in the gain and loss functions. All of the gains 
from bearing excessive interest rate risks accrue to the 
mortgage lenders while all additional losses are 
inconsequential to already insolvent thrifts. Since the 
insolvent institutions do not account for loss due to 
interest rate risks in pricing mortgage loans, they, in turn 
will price their mortgage products at a discount relative to 
solvent thrift institutions.
Considering a one-state variable of the value of a 
mortgage as given by the following equation
W r2r(82V/8r2) + b(m-r) (8v/8r)
+ 8V/8t - rV + r * 0 (7)
The first two terms represent the capital gains and 
loss from the mortgage owning to undeterministic shifts in 
term structure interest rates. For an insolvent institution 
an upward shift in the term structure of interest is of no 
consequence because the institution is already insolvent.
Any additional capital losses will have no effect on their 
already underwater financial condition. Since an insolvent 
thrift's capital loss is of no additional consequence to 
it's financial status, the institution will, in turn, not 
take into account this added loss in the pricing of its 
mortgages. The pricing equation therefore becomes
av/at -  rv + r -  o
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(8)
On the contrary, all capital gains from an downward 
shift In the term structure will fully accrue to the 
insolvent institutions. Hence the pricing equation, should 
include the capital gain terms and is represented by
horlr{d2V/Bi?) + b(m-r) OV/3r)
+ av/at - rV + r - 0 (9)
In light of the unsymmetrical nature of the gain and 
loss funtions, insolvent thrift institutions are able to 
originate fixed-rate mortgages at a discount relative to 
healthy institutions. The amount this underpricing is as 
high as 177 basis points and is reported in table 3.5 for a 
$100,000, 30 years fixed rate loan. Therefore, in addition 
to underpricing the default risks, insolvent institutions 
may also underprice the interest rate risks. Using the same 
analogy, the underpricing of mortgages by insolvent thrift 
institutions can be extended to the pricing of adjustable- 
rate mortgages.
3.2 Pricing Practices of Failed or Failing Institutions:
The Case of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMS) are widely issued by 
traditional mortgage portfolio investors. AKMs carry an
interest rate which can adjust during the life of the loan, 
and is usually tied to some financial index, such as the 
rate on the 6-month treasury-bills or 1-year treasury notes; 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's national average contract 
rate; or the average cost of funds for federally-insured 
savings and loan associations. Host of the originated ARMs 
either have life-of-loan caps and/or periodic-rate cap and 
no pure ARMs actually exist.
The market value of an ARM depends upon the contractual 
variation, the characteristics of the index rate, prepayment 
behavior, current and future interest rate and the 
probability of default. The contractual variations of an 
ARM include the index choice, the margin, the frequency of 
adjustment, the caps and the teaser rate. Each of these 
variations can affect the rate of an ARM. It is these 
contractual variations that further complicate the valuation 
of the adjustable-rate mortgage. The current literature on 
ARMs includes Asay(1984), Buser, Hendershott and Sanders 
(1985), Kau, Keenan, Muller and Epperson (1989). Asay uses 
a forward-pricing approach while Buser, Hendershott and 
Sanders and Kau, et al use a backward approach. The Asay's 
model does not actually price a true adjustable-rate 
mortgage because neither yearly caps nor prepayment are 
included. Buser, Hendershott and Sanders employ numerical 
procedures to analyze the sensitivity of the value of life- 
of-loan rate caps to variations in the term structure of
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interest rates. They find that the value of the cap depends 
importantly on both the slope of the term structure of 
interest rates and the variance of the one-month rate. Kau 
and associates also use a backward approach to analyze ARMs. 
By introducing an auxiliary state variable, they are able to 
provide a solution to the problem of path dependency of the 
current contract rate.
Using a similar analogy as presented in the case of 
fixed-rate mortgages, it follows that failed or failing 
lending institutions also have a natural incentive to 
underprice ARMs. Insolvent thrift institutions can offer 
adjustable-rate mortgages at a discount by underpricing the 
default risks and the interest rate risks as discussed 
previously for the case of fixed-rate mortgages. Firstly, 
since these institutions may not be around in future 
periods, should borrowers default, they may not be concerned 
with the default option on ARMs. Secondly, these insolvent 
institutions may also underprice the interest rate risks due 
to the unsymmetrical nature of their pricing equations as 
discussed in the fixed rate case. However, unlike fixed 
rate loans, adjustable-rate mortgages allow lenders to 
adjust for any adverse shifts in the term structure of 
interest rates conditional upon the size of the interest 
rate caps.
For an upward shift in interest rate the lender incurs 
a capital loss if and only if changes in the mortgage
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interest rate is larger than the allowable adjustment level 
of the caps. Since insolvent thrift institutions may not be 
concerned with losses due to changes in the term structure 
as argued earlier, their pricing equations for an ARM 
subject only to a life-of-loan interest rate cap now 
becomes:
ho*r(dzV/dj?) + b(m-r) (dv/dr)
+ dv/dt - rV + r = 0 if r < c
av/at - r v + r - o  if r > c
where c is the life-of-loan rate cap on the adjustable-rate 
mortgage. Table 3.6 shows the amount of underpricing to be 
between 30 to 52 basis points dependent upon the level of 
interest rate caps. This implies that failed or failing 
lending institutions can lower the price of ARMs either by 
charging a lower margin, less discount points, and/or 
offering tighter cap. Any one of these options or any 
combination thereof will make the borrower better off and, 
as a consequence, more likely to choose an ARM from failed 
or failing lending institutions
3.3 conclusion
This chapter shows that failed or failing institutions 
may price their fixed-rate mortgage loan products at a lower 
rate than well-capitalized lending institutions. The model
is based on the premise that well-capitalized lending 
institutions will worry about the conditional probability 
that the institution will remain solvent when pricing their 
mortgage products. On the other hand, failed or failing 
lending institutions that may have only a small chance of 
regaining solvency in the future period will not care about 
borrower defaults. In addition to underpricing borrower 
defaults, insolvent institutions can also underprice the 
interest rate risks. Their abilities to do so are largely 
due to the unsymmetrical nature of their capital gain and 
loss functions. Therefore, these insolvent institutions can 
underprice their loan products by offering fixed-rate 
mortgages at a discount relative to the healthy lending 
institutions.
The same argument can also be made for adjustable-rate 
mortgages. Insolvent institutions may offer adjustable-rate 
mortgages at a discount in order to encourage or allow 
continue borrowing. Moreover, because ASM borrowers are 
better off with lower points, tighter caps, or greater 
teaser rates, failed or failing lending institutions may 
offer adjustable-rate mortgages with fairly large teaser 




FIGURE 3 .  I . RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALUE OF A 
DEFAULTABLE FRM AND HOUSE PRICE
Table 3.1
Value of Mortgage with Default and Prepayment ($)
LTV .05 .10 .15
.05 78,799 78,744 78,282
.80 .10 78,799 78,768 78,457
.15 78,799 78,777 78,564
.05 83,720 83,563 82,749
.85 .10 83,723 83,614 83,015
.15 83,722 83,648 83,184
.05 88,619 88,214 86,956.90 .10 88,628 88,325 87,232
.15 88,633 88,408 87,516
.05 93,403 92,481 90,811.95 .10 93,442 92,738 91,067
.15 93,457 92,895 91,287
.05 97,704 96,038 94,074
1.00 .10 97,911 96,189 94,481
.15 98,064 96,392 94,726
Source: Kau, et al. (1986)
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Table 3.2
Value of Mortgage without Default ($)
LTV ino• .10 inH•
.05 78,800 78,832 78,993
.80 .10 78,800 78,857 79,208
.15 78,801 78,880 79,325
.05 83,728 83,832 84,055
.85 .10 83,732 83,925 85,594
.15 83,736 83,977 85,053
.05 88,685 88,962 89,216
.90 .10 88,716 89,382 90,220
.15 88,734 89,618 91,465
.05 93,884 94,144 94,517ina• .10 94,258 95,561 96,314
.15 94,675 97,067 98,196
.05 99,220 99,746 99,657
1.00 .10 103,091 102,133 103,004
.15 110,969 105,743 107,041
Source: Kau, et al. (1986)
39
Table 3.3
Value of The Default Option ($}
LTV .05 .10 .15
.05 1 88 711
.80 .10 1 89 751
.15 2 103 761
.05 8 269 1306.85 .10 9 315 1579
.15 14 329 1869
.05 66 748 2260
.90 .10 88 1057 2988
.15 101 1210 3949
.05 481 1663 3760
.95 .10 817 2823 5247
.15 1218 4172 6909
.05 1516 3708 55831.00 .10 5180 5944 8523
.15 12905 9342 12315
Source: Kau, et al. (1986)
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Table 3.4
Values of Default with Changes in Variances 
and Loan to Value Ratio 
(basis points)
LTV .05 .10 .15
.05 .03 2.29 18.49.80 .10 .03 2.31 19.53
.15 .05 2.6 19.79
.05 .21 6.99 33.96
.85 .10 .23 8.19 41.05.15 .36 8.55 48.59
.05 1.72 19.45 58.76
.90 .10 2.29 27.48 77.69.15 2.63 31.46 102.67
.05 12.51 43.24 96.36
.95 .10 21.24 73.40 136.42
.15 31.67 108.47 179.63
.05 39.42 96.41 145.161.00 .10 134.68 154.54 221.6
.15 335.53 242.89 320.19
Source: Kau, et al. (1986)
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Table 3.5
Value of Fixed-Rate Mortgages for Solvent 
and Insolvent Institutions and the interest 
Rate Risk Premium at Difference Mean Reversion Coefficient (b)
value of interest 
rate risk premium
b in basis points
0.06 3698 96.15
0.12 5835 151.71





Source: Kau and Associates (1989)
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Table 3.6
Value of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages for Solvent 
and Insolvent Institutions and the Interest 
Rate Risk Premium on a $100,000 Loan
annual, 
life-of-loan caps
value of interest 




(«,5%) 1238 32.19(l%,oo) 2011 52.19(2%,oo) 1437 37.36(00 , 00) 1161 30.19
Source: Kau and Associates (1989)
Chapter zv
Empirical Methodology
This chapter describes three estimation techniques 
designed to test whether failed or failing institutions 
underprice their mortgage loan products. Structural changes 
in the pricing of mortgages can occur whenever the 
parameters of the mortgage pricing model systematically 
change values over the data space. One way to test for 
these changes is to use the general switching regression 
model, as developed by Goldfeld and Quandt (1976). A second 
approach is to use the Chow test (1960) and a third approach 
is the Tishler and Zang (1979) technique.
4.1. Background
Suppose that there are two possible mortgage pricing 
regimes, one followed by solvent lending institutions and 
another followed by failed or failing lending institutions. 
Let the two mortgage pricing regimes be described as 
follows:
y, = x, /3, + cn, i« I, (l)
where It is an index representing solvent or well- 
capitalized lending institutions, and
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Y| ~ X, P2 + €f2 i e I2
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(2)
where I2 is an index representing failed or failing lending 
institutions. Equations (1) and (2) explain how the lender 
groups go about setting the interest rates on their mortgage 
loans in response to various exogenous or predetermined 
factors. In this notation, y, represents the interest rate 
corresponding to the ith mortgage loan, x, is a vector of 
principal co-variates, /3, and (£, * 02) are coefficient 
vectors to be estimated, and cn and ei2 are residuals which 
are assumed to be independently identically distributed as 
normal functions with mean 0 and standard deviation a.
Models similar to (1) and (2) have been used in a 
variety of contexts. One of the earliest applications of 
the switching regression model is by Hammermesh (1970). 
Hammermesh, in examining the negotiated wage rate for 
industrial firms, posited a two regime model in which the 
negotiated wage rate for the ift firm depending on the 
inverse of the unemployment rate and the annual percentage 
change in the consumer price index. He assumes that there 
is a threshold effect hence he posits two-regimes switching 
model, silber (1974) has also used the switching regression 
model to explain the spread between interest rates on 
federal agency securities. His model suggests that the 
spread between yields on agency securities and Treasuries 
depends on the size of the agency issue, with large issues
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being priced one way and small issues being priced another 
way. Other regression applications of switching model can 
be found in Fair and Jaffee (1972), Goldfeld (1976) and 
Tishler and Zang (1979).
4.2. The Chow Test
One way to test for equality of the set of coefficients 
in equations (1) and (2) is described in Chow (1960). A 
formal statement of the Chow test can be postulated by 
rewriting equations (1) and (2) as
y, * + e (3)
where e is an error term assumed to be normally distributed 
with mean 0 and variance a2. The null hypothesis for the 
Chow test is
V  *1 ^ 02
where 0, *= (0U , ..., 01k) ' from equation (1) and 02 = (021,






n{ - sample size in regime i (i«=l,2)
Q1 = Y'[I - X(X'X) '1X' ]Y, the constrained sum of 
squared residuals, and 
Q2 = y,' [I
where y( (i=l,2) is the dependent variable in regime i, and 
x, (i=l,2) is a n, x k matrix of observations on the 
explanatory variables in regime i. A significant F- 
statistic implies structural shift between regimes.
4.3 Goldfeld and Quandt Test
The Goldfeld and Quandt test allows the log-1ikelihood 
function to be maximized directly by replacing a dichotomic 
variable with a continuous differentiable approximation.
For the general formulation of (1) and (2), if the 
dichotomic variable, D{, is defined as:
0 if r, e I1
D, = D(rf) - { (5)
1 if r, e I2
where r, is an exogenously observable variable with a 
certain threshold value to separate the observations between 
and I2. The two regimes equation (1) and (2) can be 
combined with (5) to yield:
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yf - (1 - Dj)x(/?j + D,xf/82 + C| (6)
where e, * (1 - IV en +
The log-1ikelihood function, L, of the model Is:
L(a) = constant - L̂n(fi)
-h[y - (I - DJX,^ - DX2j82]'
n'1 [y - (I - D)V, - DX202] (7)
where a is the vector of parameters to estimate and n ■ (I
- D)2 a12 + D2a22 is the covariance matrix of c.
Because the log-1ikelihood function in (8) cannot be 
maximized directly due to the discontinuity in Df, it is not 
possible to obtain the necessary derivatives needed for 
optimization procedures. The solution to this problem is to 
replace the step function D4 by a continuous and 
differentiable approximation function. Goldfeld and Quandt 
(1976) suggest that the normal distribution function be used 
as an approximation of D,. It is diagrammatically presented 
in figure 4.1. Thus, D(r,) can be written as:
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D ( r , )  = J r ( l / « x / ( 2 i r ) )  e x p [ - ( % ) ( ( «  -  / i ) / a ) z] d€  ( 8 )
where £ is N(o, a2)
4.4 Tishler and Zang Test
Tishler and Zang (1979) test for structural differences 
across two equations is analogous to Goldfeld and Quandt 
(1976), except that Tishler and Zang propose a polynomial 
function as an approximation for Df. The Tishler and Zang 
test is presented in figure 4.2 and can be written as:
0 if r, < -c 
k
D(r,) = ( 2 b,r{ if -c s r, i c (9)i=0
1 if r, > c
where k and b, represent the degree and the coefficients of 
a polynomial respectively.
For a value of k = 3, the specification of D( becomes:
0 if r, <-c
1 3  1
D(rf) = {--- +   r, - -----  rf if -c<r,<c (10)
2 4c 4c3
1 if r, >c
The major difference between Goldfeld and Quandt and
Tishler and Zang tests occurs when the exogenous variable r, 
lies between -c and c. Where c is a parameter whose value 
can be chosen to be arbitrarily small. The problem with
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Tishler and Zang is the choice of the optimal value for c. 
They do not solve this problem. These estimation techniques 
as proposed by Chow, Goldfeld and Quandt, and Tishler and 
Zang are used to examine the pricing of mortgages by 
insolvent institutions.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter presents three estimation techniques to 
test whether failed or failing institutions systematically 
underbid their mortgage loans. Switching models are 
appropriate because the shift in parameter values from 
solvent to insolvent regimes is a reflection of a structural 
change, in particular, the Chow, the Goldfeld and Quandt, 
and the Tishler and Zang estimation techniques are 
described. These three approaches will be used to test for 
the underpricing of fixed-and adjustable-rate mortgages.
so
D( r , )
1/2
FIGURE 4 . 1 .  THE APPROXIMATION OF DCrl) A 6  
SUGGESTED BY GOLDFELD AND QUANDT < 1 9 7 6 )
5 I
D ( r j )
1/2
- c c
FIGURE 4 . 2 .  THE APPROXIMATION OF DCri> AS 
SUGGESTED BY T ISHLER AND ZANG Cl 9 7 9 )
Chapter ▼
Model Specifications and Empirical Results The case of Fixed-Rate Mortgages
This chapter applies the three estimation techniques 
described in the previous chapter to the pricing of Fixed- 
Rate Mortgages (FRMs). The chapter starts out with the 
pricing estimation of FRMs, and finally, empirical results 
are presented.
5.1 The Pricing of Fixed Rate Mortgages.
The conventional fixed-rate mortgage is the most common 
type of real estate financing instrument. Fixed-rate 
mortgages have an interest rate and monthly payment which 
remain constant over the life of the loan. The amount of 
interest paid and principal are limited. Fixed rate loans 
typically have maturities of thirty years. Shorter term 
FRMs of fifteen years are also offered by thrifts to reduce 
the imbalance in their asset/liability mix.
The fixed-rate mortgage, as simple as it may seem, is a 
complex contract with many covenants that legally bind the 
lender and the borrower. The fixed-rate mortgage is 
characterized by the way in which interest payments are 
determined and the borrower's options to prematurely 
terminate the contract. Perhaps, the most important
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provisions in a fixed-rate mortgage are the right to repay 
and the right to default the loan. These contractual 
provisions affect the value of the mortgage analogous to the 
manner that bond covenants affect the market value of a 
bond. It is argued that insolvent institutions do not 
consider the borrower's option to default in pricing their 
loans. And, since the put option is showed to have positive 
impact on the value of the mortgage, a failed or failing 
institution can underprice the mortgage as compared to the 
way in which a solvent Institution would price the identical 
loan. Furthermore, it is argued that insolvent thrifts may 
not consider capital losses associated with adverse changes 
in interest rates. These institutions, therefore, may offer 
fixed rate loans at a discount as compared to solvent 
institutions. This implies that the financial condition of 
the lender should affect the offered rate on the mortgage. 
The inclusion of lender characteristics has not been 
examined in the mortgage pricing literature.
Empirical studies, such as Lea (1985), Campbell and 
Dietrich (1984), Sirmans and Benjamin (1988), and Sa-Aadu 
and Sirmans (1987) have shown that there is a statistically 
significant direct relationship between the initial loan-to- 
value ratio of a mortgage and the mortgage rate. The lower 
is the required equity, the larger are the payments which, 
in turn, increases the likelihood that a borrower will not 
be able to meet the payment obligations and thereby
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increases -the probability of default. This implies a 
positive relationship between the contract rate and the 
loan-to-value ratio. Furthermore, a higher loan-to-value 
ratio, ceteris paribus. means a lower required equity. A 
lower equity means that the value of the house does not have 
to fall much before the default put option to be 'in the 
money'. Thus, default is more likely to occur.
In addition to these variables, the theory also 
suggests that the institutional aspects of the thrift will 
also affect the value of mortgages. In particular, the 
theory posits that there is a loan pricing differential 
between solvent and failed or failing savings and loan 
associations. In pricing their loans, insolvent 
institutions will systematically underprice the mortgage.
The shakier the institution, the lower the mortgage rate it 
changes.
Finally, as in previously mentioned empirical studies, 
the amount of the loan will also affect the mortgage. The 
larger the mortgage, the lower the rate tends to be. This 
is largely due to economies of scale in loan servicing. In 
light of this, the following model is formed for fixed-rate 
mortgages:
ERATE = b0 + b, LOG (LTV) + b2 LOG (A) + b3 REGKTL (1)
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where
ERATE * the effective rate
LTV = the loan-to-value ratio
A * the loan amount
REGKTL «= the capital-to-asset ratio
Furthermore, the pricing differential between solvent 
and insolvent also implies that there is a structural shift 
in the pricing model. This shift in parameter values from 
the 'solvent* regime to the 'insolvent* regime can be 
specified by the following model:
Erate, - 0O1 + j0nLOG (LTV,) + £2,LOG (A,) + e, (if REGKTL<0) (2) 
Erate, = 0OZ + J812L0G (LTV,) + jS22LOG (A,) + c2 (if REGKTL>0) (3)
5.1.1 The Chow Test
In estimating (13) and (14) the Chow test can be 
calculated according to
(Q,-Qz)/K  mF(k, n, + n2 - 2k) - ------=---------
Q2/(n1+n2-2k)
where the constrained sum of squared errors of the model (2) 
and (3) and Q2 is the unconstrained sum of squared errors 
for both regimes. A significant F-value implies a
structural change in regression equation; that is, one or 
more regression coefficient change.
5.1.2 The Goldfeld and Quandt Estimation Technique
The model can be written as:
Erate, ■* [1 - D, ]{0O1 + LOG (LTV,) + 021 LOG (A,)}
+ <J80z + 012 1/3(3 <LTVi> 022 ™>G (Ai))D.
+ €,<1-0,) + e2 (5)
The Log-1ikelihood function becomes:
LOG L = (n/2) LOG (2*) - h E LOG [0]
- h Z {Erate, - [£01 + /3„L0G (LTV,)
+ 021 LOG (A,) ] (1 - D,) - [0O2 + 012 LOG (LTV,)
+ JS22 LOG (A,)]D,)n‘1 (6)
The log-likelihood functions for the FRM cannot be 
maximized directly. This is because of the discontinuous 
D,. To resolve this problem, Goldfeld and Quandt suggest 
the normal distribution function as a replacement for the 
step function D, where as D, becomes a continuous and 
differentiable function
D, (regKTL) = (1/(V(2ir)a)) exp[-£2/(2o2) )d€ (7)
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where $ is a normal random variable with mean zero, and 
variance a2.
The maximization of the log-likelihood function for the 
FRMs should give the maximum likelihood estimation for 
parameters 0Q2, 02,, and 022.
5.1.3 The Tishler and Zang Estimation Method
Again the model of (13) and (14) can be rewritten as
Erate, - [1 - D, ]{0O, + /?„ LOG (LTV,) + 02} LOG (A,)}
+ (002 + 012 LOG (LTV,) + 0n LOG (A,) }D,
+ €,(1-0,) + €2
The Log-likelihood function becomes:
LOG L = (n/2) LOG (2jt) - \ Z LOG [«]
- h s (Erate, - [0O, + jS„LOG (LTV,)
+ 021 IXJG (A,))(l - D,) - [0O2 + 0,2LOG (LTV,)
+ 022 LOG (A,) ]D, JO'1
Tishler and Zang suggest the following polynomial 
function as a replacement for the step function D, where as 
D, becomes a continuous and differentiable function:
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0 if r, -c k
D(r,) ■ { £ b.r! if -c S r, S c 
i=0
1 if r, c
where k and b, represent the degree and the coefficients of 
a polynomial respectively.
One specific form D{ becomes:
0 if r, < -c
1 3  1
D(r,) = {--- +   rf -   r| if -c < r, < c
2 4c 4c3
1 if r, > c
The maximization of L gives the maximum likelihood 
estimation for parameters 0O1, 0O2, 012, 021, 022 for FRMs.
5.2 Data Description
Cross sectional data are used in this dissertation to 
test whether or not insolvent savings and loan institutions 
underprice their conventional mortgages. These data are 
obtained from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The 
FHLBB collects data from all major lenders including savings 
and loan associations, commerical banks and mortgage 
bankers. The data are actual conventional loans closed and 
issued in the first five working days of each month which 
are obtained by the FHLBB monthly mortgage interest rate 
survey. The loans include both fixed and adjustable rate 
loans on single family residential properties. The majority
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of loans are fully amortizing, first mortgages on 
properties, and are mostly permanent loans.
The FHLB data provide information on important 
characteristics of individual loans including fees charged 
up front, contract interest rate, the term to maturity, the 
mortgage loan amount, the loan-to-value ratio and the type 
of originator. The effective interest rate is also reported 
in the survey based on loans amortized over ten years. In 
addition to the mortgage interest rate survey data, 
financial data on all thrift institutions are collected from 
section C of the FHLBB Thrift Financial Reports. These 
institutional specific data include financial characterics 
(e.g., modified equity capital) of individual originators.
The data to be used in this dissertation cover the 
period from May 1987 through July 1987. Table 5.1 and 5.2 
report the descriptive statistics about the entire data set. 
There are over fifteen thousand fixed rate mortgages 
originated by all thrift institutions for the period. The 
ratio of fixed rate loans issued by solvent as compared to 
insolvent lenders is approximately 10 to l. The 
distribution of loans by various states is reported in table 
5.2. The largest number of fixed rate as well as adjustable 
rate loans are originated in the state of California.
The entire sample of fixed-rate mortgages is further 
restricted to only states which have more than 50 
observations. This subset of the data is used to test
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whether or not insolvent thrift institutions underprice 
their fixed-rate mortgages.
The difference in means for the effective interest 
rates on fixed rate loans orginated by solvent and insolvent 
institutions are also tested. The t-test tests the 
hypothesis that the true means of two groups are the same. 
The results of the mean tests are reported in Table 5.3 and 
5.4. Table 5.3 gives the aggregated mean test whereas Table
5.4 represents mean tests for individual states. Overall, 
there is a statistically significant underpricing of 
conventional fixed-rate mortgages by insolvent thrift 
institutions. The differences in the pricing of these loans 
are further examined in the following section.
5.3 Empirical Results and Discussions
This section attempts to demonstrate empirically that 
insolvent savings and loans institution will systematically 
underprice their fixed-rate mortgages. The underpricing 
hypothesis is tested using the previously discussed methods 
namely the Chow, the Goldfeld and Quandt and the Tishler and 
Zang tests. The results are consistent with the theory; 
that is, in general, failed or failing saving and loan 
associations appear to be underpricing their fixed rate 
loans. The magnitude of the underpricing is well within the 
theoretically simulated value.
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The Chow test rejects the hypothesis of no structural 
shift between the solvent and the Insolvent saving and loans 
institutions. The Chow-statistics is 7.18 implying 
structural difference in pricing regimes between two sets of 
institutions. The differences in the pricing of mortgages 
are also reinforced by the maximum likelihood estimation 
tests of Goldfeld and Quandt and Tishler and Zang. These 
tests result in a 2*log(likelihood) ratios of 139.66 and 
77.24 respectively, which also imply a significant deviation 
between solvent and insolvent institutions in the pricing of 
fixed-rate mortgages. The switched point and variance of 
the Goldfeld and Quandt test are -1.00 and 0.657. Its 
confidence interval at 95% level is [-2.589, 0.589]. For 
the Tishler and Zang technique the results are -0.395 and 
0.660 respectively. At 95% level, the confidence interval 
is [-0.020, 1.230].
The results of the maximization techniques are reported
in Table 5.15, 5.16 and 5.17. Table 5.17 gives the
constrained model estimation where variable coefficients are 
restricted to be identical across the two sets of saving and 
loan institutions. The Tishler and Zang and the Goldfeld 
and Quandt are done without using any dummy variables due to 
the ever-present converging difficulties of the maximum 
likelihood estimation.
The regression results are presented in Table 5.5 to
5.8. The subscript i = 1,2 represents solvent and insolvent
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institutions respectively. The signs of most of the 
coefficients are statistically significant and are as 
expected.
In addition to the intercept, the log of the loan to 
value ratio, and the log of the amount, these models also 
include several dummy variables representing the states. 
These additional dummy variables controls for regional 
differential in default risks.12 In addition to testing 
for structural differences in pricing equation, individual 
tests between pairs of coefficients are also performed.
These tests are done for different ranges of switched 
points. These results are presented in Tables 5.9 to 5.11 
and are also consistent with the theory. The statistical 
significance of the 01d and 0M are of primary interests. /9M 
is the coefficient of differences in the intercept of 
insolvent and solvent saving and loan institutions. Since 
the intercept has a positive coefficient and represents 
the coefficient differences of the intercept of the 
insolvent pricing equation from the solvent equation. A 
negative value of therefore, implies that insolvent 
saving and loans institutions underprice their fixed-rate 
mortgages. The magnitude of this coefficient further 
implies that insolvent saving and loan associations offer
12 Weighted Least squares are also used to check the 
results. There are no significant differences in results.
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their fixed-rate mortgages at 156.51 basis points lower than 
solvent institutions.
The other important parameter is the log of the loan- 
to-value ratio. Since loan to value ratio represents the 
default risk and its coefficient is positive, a negative 
value of the difference in the coefficient of the LOG(LTV) 
parameter also implies that insolvent institutions charge 
less for the default risk than solvent institutions. This 
result is also consistent with the theory.
In light of these empirical results, it is concluded 
that insolvent savings and loans do indeed underprice their 
fixed-rate mortgage as suggested by the theory.
5.4 Conclusions
The primary purpose this chapter is to demonstrate 
empirically whether or not insolvent saving and loan 
institutions offer their fixed rate loans at a discount 
relative to solvent institutions. The result of the Chow 
test and the Goldfeld and Quandt and the Tishler and Zang 
maximum likelihood estimation techniques are consistent with 
the theory of underpricing by insolvent institutions.
Indeed, these institutions do offer mortgage loans at a 
discount relative to healthy institutions.
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Table 5.1
Effective Rates on Fixed-Rate Mortgages 
Made Between May and July, 1987
Date
number 
of Loans Means Variance Range
Solvent Institutions
May 1987 4879 9.554 .437 6.48-13.09
June 1987 5306 9.856 .622 6-13.78
July 1987 3762 10.135 .869 6-16.55
May-July 1987 13947 9.825 .676 6-16.5
Insolvent Institutions
May 1987 489 9.338 .305 7.3-11.78
June 1987 564 9.668 .596 7.3-11.92
July 1987 333 10.275 .707 7.3-11.77
May-July 1987 1386 9.697 .645 7.3-11.92
All Institutions
May-July 1987 15333 9.814 .674 6.-16.55
July 1987 4095 10.146 .857 6-16.55
June 1987 5870 9.838 .622 6-13.78
May 1987 5368 9.534 .429 6.48-13.09
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Table 5.2
Sample Distribution of ARMs and FRMs by States 
















* As the percentage of ARMs originated in all state.
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Table 5.3
Difference in effective rates 
between Fixed-Rates Mortgages orginated by solvent 
and insolvent thrift institutions 
for all states for May-July 1987





Difference in means test 0.147
(t-statistics) (6.28)*
* Indicates significance at the 0.05 level
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Mbls 3.4
Diffsranea in affactive ratal batman Fixad-rata mortgages 
originated by solvent and imolvant thrift institution! 
for various statai for May-July 1987
SoLvant Thrift Insolvant Thrift Diffaranea in naans
Stata (Number of Loans) (Number of Loans) (t-statlsties)
AL 0.590 0.503 -0.003
(150) (113) (-0.04)
AZ 0.965 10.373 -0.408
(159) (10) (-1.70)
CA 0.827 0.721 0.106
(1716) (46) (0.80)
CO 0.552 9.705 -0.243
(137) (13) (-1.21)
FL 9.608 0.643 0.165
(1084) (32) (1.41)
6A 9.660 0.852 -0.192
(315) (25) (1.23)
IA 0.609 0.544 0.065
(12*) (13) (0.20)
IL 9.699 9.430 0.269
(1201) (37) (2.92)*
IN 9.904 9.785 0.110
(311) (34) (1.10)
KS 9.760 0.400 0.360
(294) (10) (2.29)*
KY 9.768 0.754 0.014
(126) (27) (0.06)
LA 9.943 9.815 0.126
(51) (50) (0.80)
MD 0.701 8.004 0.707
(220) (80) (6.88)*
MI 10.120 10.271 -0.151
(1600) (67) (-1.47)
MO 9.807 0.328 0.479
(321) (42) (5.50)*
MS 10.150 9.376 0.783
(70) (8) (3.70)*
NC 0.060 0.408 0.462
(206) (124) (6.10)*
NJ 0.868 0.043 -0.075
(760) (42) (-0.71)
OH 9.736 0.850 -0.114
(1658) (58) (-1.37)
PA 9.631 0.604 0.027
(676) (47) (0.27)
SC 9.973 0.760 0.213
(182) (43) (1.75)
IN 0.916 0.012 0.004
(180) (17) (0.02)
TX 9.291 9.817 -0.526
(322) (143) (-6.04)
VA 10.007 9.619 0.388
(176) (125) (4,82)*
HA 10.101 10.005 0.186
(58) (10) (0.88)
HI 0.577 10.820 -1.252
(247) (7) (-3.32)
* indicats signifleant at 0.05 laval
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Tab la S.9
Eatimatad Raaulta for Flxad-Rata Mortsacaa 
for tha Month of May, Juna, July, 1867 
(Unraatrlctad Modal)
lEratai - 0oi + 0n  LOGLTV + 021 LOO(A) + 03iSAL + 04iSAZ + 03J.SCA + 0eiSCO + 071SCI + 081SFL + /SgiSOA + 0ioiSHI + 0niSXA + 0121SIL + 013iSIN + 0i4iSKS + 015iSKY + 0ieiSLA + 6l71 
SMA+ flieiSMD + 0191SMI + 02O1SMO + 0211SMS + 0221SNC + 0231*** * 0 U & M  * 0251SNT + 0261SOH + 027isPA + 0281SSC + d29i8TN + 03O1STX + 03H&VA + 032iSWI
(1-1)
Varlabla Paramatara Varlabla Paramatara
Coaffielanta Eatimataa Coaffielwnta Eatimataa
001(CONSTANT) 12.0609 017l(SMA) -0.0223
(70.07) (-0.28)
011(LOGLTV) 0.0656 018l(SM» -0.2386
(2.59) (-2.79)
021(LOG(A)) -.211* 0191(SHI> 0.0622
(-15.*1) (1.19)
031(SAL) -0.401* 02O1(SHO) -0.2167
(-*.37) (-2.72)
041(SA2) -0.0201 02h (SMS) 0.11*2
(-0.2) (0.99)
051(SCA) -0.058* 0221(SNC) -0.0*98
(-0.8*) (-0.58)
061(SCO) -0.4217 0231(SNE) -0.2*61
(-*.**) (-2.16)
071(SCT) -0.0658 024l(SHJ) -0.0*66
(-0.66) (-0.6*)
061(SFL) -0.2066 0251<SNY) -0.1*66
(-2.93) (-1.83)
091(SGA) -0.3131 0261(SOH) -0.2987
(-3.91) (-4.32)
01O1(SHI) 0.0772 0271(SPA) -0.391*
(0.83) (-5.36)
011l(SIA) -0.4669 026l(SSC) -0.0322
(-4.79) (-0.36)
0121(SIL> -0.3039 029i(STH) -0.102*
(-*.33) (-1.15)
0131(SIN) -0.1607 03O1(SIX) -0.71*2
(-2.00) (-8.95)
0141(SKS) -0.2*89 031KSVA) 0.0534
(-3.06) (0.60)










Eatimatad Raaulta for Flxad-Rata Mortgagee 
for tha Month of May, Juna, July, 19B7 
(Unraatrlctad Modal)
[ E r a t o i  -  0 P i  +  diiLOGLTV +  0 2 i  LOG(A) +  £31 SAL +  0 « iS A Z  +  0 S iS C A  +  0 6 iS C O  + 0 7 iS C T  +  0 e iS F L  
+  0 9 iS G A  +  d io iS H I  +  0 H iS I A  +  0 i2 iS J L  + 0 i3 iS I H  +  0 m S K S  +  0 i5 iS K )f +  01B iSL A  +  0 l+ 0 l8 iS M D  +  
0191SM I +  02O1SMO +  0 2 uS M S + 0221SNC +  0231SN E +  0211S N J  +  02S1SHY +  0261SOH +  0 2 7 iS P A  +  0 2 e i  
SSC +  02BiSTH  +  flaoiST X  +  03H S V A  +  0321SW I
(1-2)
Varlabla Paramatara Varlabla Paramatara
Coaffielanta Eatimataa Coaffielanta Eatimataa
002(CONSTANT) 10.195B 0172(SMA) 1.0113
(16.B2) (1.36)
012(LOGLTV) 0.0162 0182(SMD) -1.1716
(0.19) (-6.SO)
022 (LOG(A)) -0.0557 0192(SMI) 0.1789
(-1.16) (0.97)
032(SAL) -0.1B3B 02O2(SMO> 0.7521(-2.78) (-3.81)
0 «  (SAB) 0.3102 0212(SMS) -0.6871
(1.09) (-2.22)
052(SCA) -0.3273 0222(SHC) -0.5711
(-1.69) (-3.30)
062(SCO) -0.2696 0232(SHE) 0.5115
(-1.03) (0.67)
082(SFL) -0.1378 0242(SNJ) -0.1126
(-2.11) (-0.37)
092(SGA) -0.2230 0262(SOiI) -0.2471
(-1.02) (-1.31)
0112(SIA) -0.5221 0272(SPA) -0.1711
(-2.00) (-2.45)
0122(SIL) -0.6513 0282CSSC) -0.3074
(-3.16) (-1.57)
0132(SIH) -0.3075 0292(STH) -0.1519
(-1.61) (-0.63)
01*2(S1CS) -0.6786 03O2(STX) -0.2179
(-2.90) (-1.45)
0152(SKV) -0.3352 0312(SVA) -0.1388
(-1.56) (-2.51)











555**0- (IMS)Z60 xeiz'o- (JOS) 5*0
(T5 T-) (ei*G-)
5911*0- (VAS)*60 tcez'o- (SHS)**0
(09*1-) (es'z-)
*A*5*0- (X1S)060 8891*0- (HIS)6*0
(GS't-) (50*5-)
OZTfO- (HIS)BZ0 azcco- (IIS)610
(00*1-) (EI*6->
9190*0- (OSS)660 ZZ£»•0- (VIS)**0
(eo*s-) (Z9‘0)
*90**0- (vas) «0 6550*0 (IHS) 0*0
(81**-) (IZ*»-)
i6oe*o- (BOS)3Z0 me*o- (VOS) 80
(8TZ-) ((T* *£-)
0191*0- (AHS)6Z0 Z9ZZ*0- (US) 60
(88*0-) (B80-)0190*0- (fHS)«0 8980*0- (10S) 10
(TZ*Z-) (*9 * *-)
SS*Z*0- (IHS)6Z0 Z9T**0- (OOS) 90
(8B*Z-) (ie*t-)
9SZZ*0- (OHS)660 8580*0- (VDS) 50
(BZ'O) (81*0-)
eteo*o HS)*60 6010*0- (ZVS) *0
(eb*g-) (86*5-)
Q98Z*0- (CHS)OZ0 691**0- (TVS) 60
(*T"T) (68**1-)
5810*0 (IHS)a*0 I96T'- ((V)301) 60
(8Z*9~) (St*Z>
608**0- ((MS) 610 ezso * o (Aiion) *0
(»S*0-) (I0*Zi)
91*0*0- (VHS)6*0 1696*II (1HVISHOO) 00
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M l *  3.0
Eatimated Reaulta for Fix*d-R«t» Mortgagee 
for tha Month of May, Juna, July, 1B07
(Erate - 0O + 01 LOGLTV + 02 LOG(A)
03 SAL + 04 SAZ + 03 SCA + 06 SCO + 07 SCT 
08 SFL + 09 SGA + 0ioSHI + 0nSIA + 012 SIL
013SIH + 014SKS + 013SKY + 0igSLA + 017SMA
018SM) -I- 019SMI + 020SMO + 021 SMS + 022SBC
023SHE + 024SHJ + 025SKY + 028SOB + 027SPA




















































































































E a t im a t a d  R a a u lt a  f o r  F lx a d - R a t e  M o r tg a g e r  
f o r  ttaa M onth o f  M ay, J u n e ,  J u l y ,  1 9 9 7  
( T e a t in g  f o r  p a l r a  c o e f f i c i e n t s )
[ E r a to  -  fl0 +  fix LOGLTV +  fi2 LOG(A)
83 SAL + 94 SAZ + 85 SGA + 9e SCO 
98 SFL + 99 SGA + BllBIA + 9l2SIL 
913 SIN + B14SKS + 91SSKY + 9lBSLA + 917SMA 
91BSMD + 9igSMI -I- 920 SMO + 921 SMS + 9228NC 
923SNE + 924SNJ + 926SOH + 927SPA 
928SSC + 829STII 4- 930 SIX + 931SVA 4- 932SHI
Bod4- 9ldD*LOGLTV 4- 92dD*L0G(A)
93dD*SAL 4- 9*dD *SA 2 4- 9 5 d D*SCA 4- 9 6 d D*SCO 4  8 7 d D*SCT 
9edD *SF L  4  9gdD *S6A  4  6 10(f)*SH I 4  9 l lJ 5 * S I A  4  B l2e*>*SIL 
9 l3 d P * S lH  4  9 n t P * S K S  4  9l3<#>*SKY 4  9 l6 cP * S L A  4  8 i 7c0*SMA
9 i b <#>*SMD 4  9 l9dP *SM I 4  9 2 0 iP*SM0  4  9 21<#>*SMS 4  9 2 2 tP * SNC
923dP*SNE 4  9 2 4(f>*SNJ 4  8 2 JdP*SNY 4  8 26<p*SO H  4  9 2 7 c f* S P A
928J>*SS C  4  9 2 8 J)*STH  4  930(P *ST X  4  831tP *SV A  4  932<#I*SWI
Varlabla Paramatara Varlabla Paramatara
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Eatimatad Kaaults for Fixad-Rata Mortal*** 
fox tha Month of Mar, JtMa, July, 1887 
i Ht l s t  fox pairs coaffielanta 
]-1.0,1 .0 t
[E r a ta  -  0 O +  0 i  LOGLTV +  0 2  LOG(A)
03 SAL + 0* SAZ + 05 SCA + 06 SCO 
08 SFL + 09 SGA + 011SIA + 012S1L 
013SIN + 0iiSKS + 015SKY + 010SLA + 017SMA 
018SMD + 019SHI + 020SMO + 02lSMS + 022SHC 
023SNE + 021SNJ 4 026SOH 4 027SPA 
028SSC 4 028STN 4 03OSTX 4 03iSVA 4 032SWI
0od+ 01dD*LOGLTV 4 02iiD*LOG(A)
03dD*SAL 4  0 i d D*SAZ 4  0 3(JD*SCA 4  0 6dD*SCO 4  0 7 d D*SCT 
08dD *SF L  4  0 g d D*SSA 4  0 i Otfl*S H I 4  0 H (0 )* S IA  4  012c#)*SIL  
0 1 3 (P * S IR  4  0 U (p * S K S  4  015rf)*SKY 4  016dP*SLA  4  0 17(jP«SMA
018dP*SMD 4  0 18J)*SM I 4  02O(P*SMO 4  0 2 1<0*SMS 4  0 22(p»SKC
023<#>*SNE 4  0 2 ir f)« S N J  4  0 2 s J>*SNY 4  02ScP*SOH 4  0 2 7 <p*SPA
028rf)*SSC  4  028rf)*STN 4  03O<p*STX 4  0 3 1<0>*SVA 4  0 3 2 J)*S H I
Varlabla Paxanatars Varlabla Paramatara
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E a t im a t a d  R a a u lt a  f o r  F ix a d - R a t a  H o r tg a c a a  
f o r  t h a  M onth o f  H ay , J u n a , J u l y ,  1 9 6 7  
T a a t ln g  f o r  p a i r s  c o a f f i e l a n t a  
T ia ta la r /Z a n j  an d  O o ld fa ld /Q u a n d t  
) - l . 3 , 1 . 3 [
t E r a ta  -  0 O +  01 LOGLTV +  0 2 LOG (A )
3 3  SAL +  0*  SAZ +  0 5  SCA +  0 6  SCO 
3 a  SFL +  0 a  SGA +  011S IA  +  012 SIL  
0 1 3 S IN  + 0 1 4 SK3 +  0 1 5 SKY +  0 i« S L A  +  0 1 7  SMA 
01SSH D  +  0 iq S H I  + 0 2 0 SMO +  0 2 1 SMS +  0 2 2 SNC 
0 2 3 SHE +  0 2 * SNJ +  0 2 8 SOB +  0 2 7  SPA 
0 2 6 SSC +  0 2 9 STN +  03QSTX +  031SV A  +  0 3 2  SWI
0od+ 01dD*LOGLTV + 02dD*LOG(A)
03dD*SAL + 0*dD*SAZ + 03dD*SCA + 0edD*SCO  +  07dD*SCT  
08dD *SF L  +  0gdI>*SGA + 0 io < P * S H I +  011<P*5IA  +  0 n J »S IL  
013< p *S IN  +  0 i*< p *S K S  + 015(P»S1CY 4  016<P<<SLA 4  0i7<P*SM A
018<P*SMD 4  0 i9cp *S M I 4  02O<P<<SHO 4  02i<p*SMS 4  022j)*S N C
023<P*SNE 4  02*<p*S N J 4  025<p*SNY 4  026<P*SOB 4  0 2 7<p*SPA
02BcP*SSC  4  029<p*STN 4  03O<P<<STX 4  03l<p*SV A  4  0 32<P*SHI
Varlabla Paramatara Varlabla Paramatara
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Estimated Results for Fixed-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
(Unrestricted Model)



























Estimated Results for Fixed-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
(Restricted Model)
[Erate *= 0O + /3, LOGLTV + 02 LOG(A)]
Variable Parameter
Coefficients Estimates t-Statistic
0Q (CONSTANT) 11.7153 (79.31)
Pi (LOGLTV) -0.0276 (-1.14)





Estimated Results for Fixed-Rate Mortgages
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
[Erate = 0O + 0y LOGLTV + 02 LOG (A) + 0Z REGKTL]
Variable Parameter
Coefficients Estimates t-Statistic
0O (CONSTANT) 11.5743 (78.29)
0, (LOGLTV) -0.0089 (-0.37)
02 (LOG(A)) -0.1619 (-13.61)






ML Estimated Results for Fixed-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
(Unrestricted Model)
Using Goldfeld and Quandt





















HL Estimated Results for Fixed-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
(Unrestricted Model)
Using Tishler and Zang
[Erate, = *•! + fi,. LOGLTV + (1=1,2)




/801 (CONSTANT) 11.6000 (216.16)
(LOGLTV) -0.0199 (-9.43)
041 (LOG (A)) -0.1500 (-71.04)
0O2 (CONSTANT) 11.8809 (114.91)
/812 (LOGLTV) -0.0074 (-0.43)








ML Estimated Results for Fixed-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
(Restricted Model)
Using Goldfeld and Quandt and Tishler and Zang





0O (CONSTANT) 11.2193 (148.92)
0, (LOGLTV) 0.0585 (8.18)
fit (LOG(A)) -0.1493 (-56.00)
chapter vz
Modal Specifications and Empirical Rasulta 
Tba Casa of Adjustable-Rate Mortgagas
This chapter applies the three estimation techniques 
described in chapter IV to the pricing of Adjustable-Rate 
Mortgages (ARMs). The chapter starts out with the pricing 
estimation of ARMs. Finally, empirical results and 
discussions are presented.
6.1 The Pricing of Adjustable Rata Mortgagas.
Adjustable-rate mortgages are the most popular 
alternative to the traditional fixed rate loans. ARMs carry 
an interest rate which can adjust during the life of the 
loan, and is usually tied to some financial index, such as 
the rate on the 6-month treasury-bills or 1-year treasury 
notes; the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's national average 
contract rate; and the average cost of funds for federally- 
insured savings and loan associations.
ARMs have grown in popularity as a solution to the 
thrift industry's liquidity crisis of the early 1980's. 
Furthermore, as fixed-rate mortgage rates become very high, 
the house affordability index falls to a low level. ARMs, 
then, provide a means for potential borrowers to obtain 
homeownership. In addition, ARMs also serve as a hedging 
mechanism for the lender's portfolio. A basic ARM contract 
usually includes key features such as
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(1) interest rate caps which limit the change in the 
contract rate on the adjustment period. If market 
rates rise above the cap, the lender suffers a loss in 
interest. Interest rate caps are typically 1 or 2 
percent points above or below the last period's rate.
(2) an adjustable interest rate ties to certain market 
interest rate index.
(3) a margin of contract rate above the market index. This 
margin is usually fixed ranging from 100 to 300 basis 
points. However, the margin in the subsequent years 
generally is higher than in the first year;
(4) Some ARMs may also include lifetime interest rate caps. 
Lifetime caps usually set at around 5 percentage points 
above the initial contract rate.
(5) Payment caps are sometimes specified in place of 
interest rate caps. They limit the increase in 
periodic payments. Unlike interest rate caps, the 
lender's loss in interest from sudden increase in rates 
is usually carried forward through negative 
amortization. A typical payment cap is 7.5 percent per 
year, with 125 percent limit on negative amortization. 
The market value of an ARM depends upon the contractual
variation, the characteristics of the index rate, prepayment 
behavior, current and future interest rates and the 
probability of default. Each of these variations can affect 
the value of an ARM.
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Higher margins result in larger payments, but also are 
conducive to a higher probability of prepayment. The 
greater the frequency of adjustment, the greater will be the 
value of an ARM, in rising interest rate expectation. The 
longer the period between adjustments, the more an ARM will 
resemble a fixed rate mortgage, and the lesser will be the 
price of an ARM as the mortgage is more exposed to interest 
rate risk. And finally, periodic and lifetime caps restrict 
upward movement of the contract rate and, thus, decrease the 
value of the ARM.
The teaser rate or the initial period discount, will 
reduce the value of an ARM. Assumability has a negative 
effect upon mortgage value, but the effect is not nearly as 
great as it is for fixed rate loans. The choice of index may 
be important in the determination of the market value of an 
ARM. One year treasury rate is the most typical due to its 
correlation with the relevant market rate.
Prepayment detracts from the value of an ARM. Assuming 
no transaction costs, prepayment occurs when the market 
interest rate is less than the contract rate. Since the 
contract rate also decreases with the market rate for an 
ARM, it is expected that the probability of prepayment will 
be less than that associated with a fixed rate mortgage. 
However, there exists sub-optional prepayment regardless of 
the relationship between the original contract rate and the
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market rate due to borrower's perceived minimal rate, 
prepayment may still be substantial.
In addition to these variables, the institutional 
aspects of the thrift will also affect the value of 
mortgages as previously discussed in the FRM case. That is, 
in pricing their loans, insolvent institutions will 
systematically underprice the mortgage.
The following regression model is estimated for 
adjustable rate mortgage:
ERATE = b0 + b,LTV + b2LOG (A) + b3CAP + b*LIFE
+ b5ADJ + b6TEASER + b^REGKTL (8)
where
ERATE = the effective interest rate
LTV = the loan-to-value ratio
A - the amount of loan
CAP « the periodic rate cap
LIFE = the lifetime rate cap
ADJ = the adjustment period
TEASER = the initial discount amount
REGKTL = the capital-to-asset ratio
As discussed in the pricing of FRMs section, the 
effective yield and loan-to-value ratio are positively 
correlated, so are the institution's capital ratio, the
86
frequency of adjustment and the teaser. The remaining 
coefficients should be negative.
Similarly, the switching models for the pricing of 
adjustable-rate mortgages are specified as:
ERATE, * a01 + a,, LTV, + a21 LOG (A,) + a31 CAP,
+ a41 LIFE, + a5, ADJ, + 0t61 TEASER, + 6,
(if REGKTL ) 0) (9)
ERATE, = a02 + a,2 LTV, + a22 LOG (A,) + a32 CAP,
+ a42LIFE, + a52 ADJ, + TEASER,
+ e2 (if REGKTL <« 0) (10)
6.2 The Chow Test For Adjustable-Rate Mortgage
The Chow test aims to test equality of sets of 
coefficients in two regressions is now widely used in 
econometric and other research. The basic regression model 
of (1) and (2) can be rewritten as
Y1 = xîi + ei
and
Yj = x202 + e2
where £, and are least squares estimator vectors and e, are 
residual vectors. An alternative expression of the above 
model is:
Y - x£ + e
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The null hypothesis is 
H0: 0, * 02
where ^  = On» * • • * 1 &z * ^ 2 t̂ • * * * &2k̂ '1 ^^e ,̂—
test statistic, known as the Chow test is given by
(Qr Q2)/k
F(k, n,+n2-2k) = ----------------
Q2/(n,+n2-2k)
where
n, = sample size in regime i (i=l,2)
Q, = Y'[I - X(X'X)'̂ X' ] Y, the constrained sum of squared 
residuals
Q2 - V C I - X ^ V X ^ X ^ + Y ^ I - X ^ X ^ r ’x^Ya 
Y, = n, x 1 vector of observations in the dependent 
variable regime i (i=l#2)
X, = n, x k matrix of observations on the explanatory 
variables in regime i (i=l,2)
6.3 The Estimation of ARMs using Goldfeld and Quandt Model
The rate equations with 'solvent' and 'insolvent* 
regimes can then be rewritten as:
ERATE, = [1 - D,]{ct01 + a,, LTV, + a21 LOG (A,) + a3, CAP,
+ a41 LIFE, + a51 ADJ, + a6, TEASER,}
+ {o02 + a,2 LTV, + a22 LOG (A,) + a32 CAP,
+ a42 LIFE, + a52 ADJ, TEASER,} D,
+ e, (1 - D,) + D, e2
88
The log-likelihood function (L) of the above 
specification equation is:
L - (n/2) LOG (2JT) - h E LOG [0]
- h Z {ERATE, - [X - D,][a01 + a,, LTV, + a21 LOG (A,)
+ a3, CAP, + a41 LIFE, + a5, ADJ, + a6, TEASER, ]
- [o02 + a,2 LTV, + a22 LOG (A,) + a32 CAP, + a42 LIFE,
+ a52 ADJ, + aa TEASER, ]D,>n‘1
where (1 is the covariance matrix of e.
Again, the D, function follows the specification of 
Goldfeld and Quandt:
D,(regKTL) = (1/(/(2»r)a)) exp[-€2/(2a2) ]d?
where 5 is N(o, a2)
The maximum likelihood estimation procedure will 
determine the values for a01, cr,,, a21, a31, a41, a51, a61, a02,
®12' a 22' a 32' a 42' a 52 a n d  a 62*
6.4 Estimations For ARMs using Tishler and zang Model
The model for the pricing of adjustable-rate mortgages 
are specified as:
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ERATE, « a01 + a,, LTV, + a21 LOG (A,) + a31 CAP,
+ a41 LIFE, + a5, ADJ, + a61 TEASER, + 6,
(if REGKTL ) 0)
ERATE, = a02 + a12 LTV, + LOG (A,) + CAP,
+ a42LIFE, + a52 ADJ, + TEASER,
+ e2 (if REGKTL < 0)
The rate equations can then be rewritten as:
ERATE, = [1 - D,]{a01 + O,, LTV, + C21 LOG (A,) + a3, CAP,
+ a4, LIFE, + a51 ADJ, + a61 TEASER,}
+ {aQ2 + o,2 LTV, + 022 LOG (A,) + a32 CAP,
+ a42 LIFE, + a52 ADJ, TEASER,} D,
+ C, (1 “ D,) + D, €2
with the log-1ikelihood function
L = (n/2) LOG (2*) - h E LOG [ft]
- h s (ERATE, - [1 - D,][a01 + O,, LTV, + a2, LOG (A,)
+ a3, CAP, + a41 LIFE, + a5, ADJ, + a6, TEASER,]
“ [̂ 02 + tt12 LTV» + a22 (Af) + a32 CAPf + LIFE,
+ a52 ADJ, + aa TEASER, ]D,} ft’1
where ft is the covariance matrix of c.
Again, the D, function is specified as follows
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0 if r, < -c1 3  l
D(rt) = {--- +   r, -   r? if -c < r, < c
2 4c 4ce
1 if r, > c
The maximization of L gives the maximum likelihood 
estimation for parameter j0o1, pQZ, 012, 021 and 0Z2 for
ARHs.
6.5 Data Descriptions
Data in this study are obtained from the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). These information on mortgages are 
collected monthly by the FHLBB from all major lenders 
including savings and loan associations, commercial banks 
and mortgage bankers. The loans are both fixed-rate and 
adjustable-rate mortgages on single-family residential 
properties and are permanent fully amortizing, first 
mortgages on properties. There are, however, some 
construction-purchase loans also included in the data set. 
These mortgages are conventional loans closed during the 
first five working days of the month.
The FHLB data include information on various 
characteristics of individual mortgages including fees 
charged up front, contract interest rate, the term to 
maturity, the mortgage loan amount, the loan-to-value ratio 
and the type of originator. The effective interest rate is 
also reported in the survey based on loans amortized over 
ten years. Since 1986, the base rate for all loans and the
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Interest rate adjustment-period and life-of-loan interest 
rate caps for adjustable-rate mortgages are also included in 
the survey data. The type of index is, however, not 
included in the FHLBB survey data. In addition to the FHLB 
data, the quarterly financial data on all lenders are also 
collected. These institutional specific data include 
financial characterics of individual lenders.
Descriptive statistics of all adjustable-rate mortgages 
are reported in Table 6.1 to 6.5. A total of 13,662 
adjustable rate loans were originated during the three peak 
loan closing months of 1987. A majority of these mortgages 
were originated by healthy thrift institutions. The number 
of adjustable rate loans issued by insolvent thrift 
institutions was less than two percent of all AKMs. On the 
average, an ARM originated by a solvent institution has 
higher loan-to-value ratio, and higher periodic and life-of- 
loan interest rate caps than an ARM originated by an 
insolvent institution. However, the adjustment period of an 
insolvent thrift's adjustable rate loan is higher. Similar 
to fixed-rate mortgages, the largest number of adjustable 
rate loans were originated by lenders in California. Tables
6.14 and 6.15 give the distribution of ARMs for various 
ranges of ARMs for various ranges of life-of-loan and 
periodic-rate caps by states. Differences in means of 
effective interest rates for ARMs with periodic rate cap
92
[0,2%] are also tested and are reported In Table 6.6 for 
solvent and Insolvent institutions for various states.
To conduct the empirical analysis, a subset of 
adjustable-rate mortgages was chosen which only include 
loans with periodic rate cap [0,2%] originated in 
California. A single state was used to minimize the effect 
of regional variations in default losses. Tests for 
differences in means are also performed on the data. Table 
6.7 reports the results of differences in means tests for 
all adjustable rate loans with periodic rate caps [0,2%] 
originated by both sets of institutions. The results 
indicate that, indeed, insolvent thrifts do significantly 
underprice their adjustable-rate mortgages as compared to 
loans offered by healthy institutions. The t-test for 
testing the hypothesis of no differences in the true means 
between solvent and insolvent institutions are further 
extended to various ranges of teaser rates. The results of 
these tests are included in Table 6.8. The same conclusion 
can also be drawn from the results of these differences of 
the mean tests. In general, insolvent thrift institutions 
seem to underprice their adjustable-rate mortgages vis-a-vis 
solvent institutions. The differences in the pricing are 
further tested using the Chow, Goldfeld and Quandt and 
Tishler and Zang techniques.
6.6 Empirical results and discussion
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It is argued throughout this dissertation that 
insolvent saving and loans institutions will systematically 
underprice their loan products by offering mortgages at a 
discount. This section attempts to test this underpricing 
hypothesis for the case of adjustable-rate mortgages using 
the Chow, Goldfeld and Quandt, and Tishler and Zang tests 
specified in Chapter IV.
In all tests the results indicate that insolvent saving 
and loans institutions do significantly underprice their 
adjustable-rate mortgages. The Chow test results in a Chow- 
statistic of 29.84 which is highly significant. The same 
results are also achieved for the Goldfeld and Quandt and 
the Tishler and Zang tests. The values of -2*Loglikelihood 
ratios are 108.54 and 92.78 for the Goldfeld and Quandt and 
the Tishler and Zang methods respectively, which are also 
statistically significant at one percent level. The optimal 
switched points are found to be at -1.00 and -1.56 
respectively for the two techniques. With variances of 
0.160 and 0.161, the 95% confidence intervals for the two 
tests are [-1.76, 0.24] and [-2.35, 0.77], respectively. 
Table 6.13 presents the results for the Goldfeld and Quandt 
test and Table 6.14 is the result of the Tishler and Zang 
test. In order to calculate the %2 test statistics, the 
constrained maximum likelihood estimation is also run using 
the restricted model, and the results are reported in Table 
6.15.
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Table 6.9 presents the results of the unconstrained 
models for adjustable-rate mortgages. The subscript i« 1,2 
represents the solvent and insolvent institutions, 
respectively. All coefficients for the solvent institutions 
are significant while only the coefficient of the constant 
is significant for the insolvent case. The insignificance 
of these variables is to a large extent consistent with the 
underpricing proposition. Furthermore, the test for pair 
coefficients are also performed in order to see which of the 
variables are priced differently between the two sets of 
institutions.13 From Table 6.12, the periodic rate cap and 
the adjustment period variables are significantly different 
between institutions. The positive coefficient of the 
difference in coefficients and the insignificant cap 
variable of the insolvent institutions indicates the 
insensitivity of these institutions to changing in periodic 
rate cap. That is, solvent institutions charge higher rates 
for tighter periodic rate caps than insolvent institutions. 
For every percent decrease in a periodic-rate cap, a solvent 
saving and loans association would charge 39.7 basis points 
higher than would a insolvent institution. A large change 
in the level of rate is of inconsequential to the insolvent 
institutions, since it already is insolvent. It is a no 
loss proposition for the insolvent savings and loan to take
13Same results are also obtained with weighted least 
square regression
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on a higher level of risks. The results are consistent with 
the theory.
The sane argument can also apply for the negative and 
significance of the difference in the adjustment variable 
(i.e., 0W= 0insolvent-/9iolvem) since the longer the adjustment 
period, the lesser the frequency of adjustment. Therefore, 
a higher the rate is charged on an adjustable-rate mortgage 
which, in turn, implies that a insolvent savings and loan 
institution will charge less for a longer period between 
adjustment. Table 6.10 gives the estimated results for the 
restricted model where all coefficients are constrained to 
be equal across all solvent and insolvent institutions.
To further show that insolvent institutions underbid 
their adjustable-rate mortgage, a capital-to-asset variable 
is included in the model as proxy for the financial status 
of an institution. The healthier a savings and loans 
association, the higher the ratio, since the estimated value 
of this variable is statistically significant and is 
positive. It is further showed that, indeed, the healthier 
an savings and loan institution the higher the rate it will 
charge on its adjustable rate loans, or that insolvent 
institutions underprice their adjustable-rate mortgage loans 




This chapter presents the model specifications for the 
case of adjustable-rate mortgages. The Chow, Goldfeld and 
Quandt and Tishler and Zang techniques previously discussed 
are used to test for the pricing differentials across 
solvent and insolvent savings and loans institutions. 
Overall, the results are consistent with the proposed 
theory. That is, in general, failed or failing institutions 
do indeed underprice their adjustable-rate mortgages.
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Table 6.1
Effective Rates on Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 
Originated Between May and July 1987
Number
of
Date Loans Mean Variance Range
Solvent Institutions
May 1987 2986 8.207 .596 5.93-11.27
June 1987 4931 8.310 .597 6.13-11.35
July 1987 5511 8.451 .637 5.96-12.41
May-July 1987 13428 8.345 .616 5.93-12.41
Insolvent Institutions
May 1987 57 7.897 .421 7.03-10.59
June 1987 93 8.255 .450 7.20-10.86
July 1987 84 8.275 .569 7.27-11.20
May-July 1987 234 8.175 .447 7.03-11.20
All Institutions
May 1987 3043 8.201 .582 5.93-11.27
June 1987 5024 8.309 .595 6.13-11.35
July 1987 5595 8.448 .636 5.96-12.41
May-July 1987 13662 8.342 .614 5.93-12.41
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Table 6.2
Characteristics of ARMs Originated for 
the Months of May Through July 1987
Insolvent Solvent Both
a) LTV (%) 
average 
range







c) Life of Loan cap 
average 5.75
range 1-99.99
























Distribution of ARMs by Various States and 
Period of Adjustments 
(1987)
State 1 month 6 months 12months
CA 3130 1718 1620
FL 384 23 1027
IL 160 40 289
HA 43 12 212
HO 84 4 201
NJ 16 3 351
NY 148 7 835
OH 79 11 225
TN 22 8 156
TX 56 1 74
WA 47 8 167
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Table 6.4





State [0,2[ [2,4[ [4,6[ >=6
CA 2 82 5871 540
FL - — 882 705
IL 2 22 436 135
MA - — 115 240
MO - 3 200 175
NJ - 10 301 407
NY - 270 462 511
OH - 11 343 150
TN - 3 137 54
TX - 1 110 34
HA _ 7 208 60
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Table 6.5
Number of ARMs for Various Ranges of Periodic Cap Rate
For the Year 1987
State [0,2[ [2,4[ [4,6[ >=6
CA 1751 1354 1753 637
FL 63 1140 314 67
IL 70 347 177 1
MA 15 286 43 11
MO 9 285 83 1
NJ 6 659 16 37
NY 57 948 152 86
OH 146 259 84 15
TN 80 82 28 4
TX 9 80 46 10
WA 12 144 47 72
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Table 6.6
Differences in effective rates between 
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages with periodic rate cap [0f2%] 
originated by solvent and Insolvent Thrift Institutions 
in various states for May-July 1987
Difference in





AL 8.463 8.467 -0.004
(29) (11) (-0.02)AR 8.282 8.268 0.014
(18) (12) (0.06)
CA 8.015 7.861 0.154
(2465) (102) (3.28)*
FL 7.868 8.110 -0.242
(816) (2) (-0.50)GA 8.184 8.785 -0.601
(177) (4) (-1.15)IL 8.448 8.483 -0.035
(256) (12) (-0.15)
IN 8.619 9.557 -0.938
(92) (3) (-2.27)*KY 8.438 7.990 0.448
(69) (3) (2.22)*LA 8.277 7.870 0.357
(7) (1) (0.43)MI 8.570 8.514 0.056
(113) (7) (0.28)MO 8.249 7.735 0.514
(235) (6) (1.55)NJ 8.533 7.961 0.572
(539) (10) (3.09)*OH 8.827 8.333 0.494
(240) (12) (2.31)*OK 8.285 8.363 -0.078
(12) (3) (-0.27)TX 8.486 8.498 -0.012
(34) (12) (-0.05)WA 8.598 8.025 0.573
(67) (2) (0.91)
* indicates significance at the 0.05 level
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Table 6.7
Differences in effective rates between 
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages with periodic rate cap [0,2%] 
originated by solvent and insolvent thrift institution 
in state of Califorinia for May-June 1987





Difference in means 
(t-statistic)
test 0.154(3.28)*
* indicates significance at the 0.05 level
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Table 6.8
Differences in effective rates between 
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages with periodic rate cap 
[0,2%] originated by solvent and insolvent institutions in 





































Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
(Unconstrained Model)
[Erate, - 0O. + /}„ LTV + 0̂ . LOG (A) + 03, TEASER 





0O1 (Constant) 10.1270 (42.94)
(Loan to Value Ratio) 0.0099 (13.73)
021 (Log (Amount) ) -0.1654 (-8.61)
j9}1 (Teaser Rate) -0.0498 (-5.25)
(Periodic Rate Cap) -0.4988 (-15.22)
051 (Life of Loan Cap) -0.1718 (-10.34)
061 (Adjustment Period) 0.0809 (15.72)
PQZ (CONSTANT) 8.9963 (10.07)
0K (Loan to value ratio) 0.0041 (1.42)
0 22 (LOG (Amount) ) -0.0911 (-1.26)
0 32 (Teaser Rate) -0.0820 (-1.51)
0 iZ (Periodic Rate Cap) -0.1016 (-0.86)
0 S2 (Life of Loan Cap) -0.0213 (-0.37)













* See text for definition of variables
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Table 6.10
Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
(Constrained Model)
[Erate • p + p. LTV + P2 LOG (A) + JB, TEASER + p. CAP






py (Loan to Value Ratio)
P2 (Log(Amount))
pz (Teaser Rate)
(Periodic Rate Cap) 




















Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987
[Erate - 0 + 0 .  LTV + 0, LOG (A) + 0, TEASER + 0, CAP 




















Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
(Testing for Pair Coeffients)
[Erate - 0O + 0. LTV + 0, LOG (A) + p, TEASER + CAP
+ 05 LIFE + 06 ADJ]





/30 (CONSTANT) 10.1270 (43.31)
01 (LTV) 0.0099 (13.84)
/92 (LOG(A)) -0.1654 (-8.69)
/93 (TEASER) -0.0498 (-5.30)
04 CCAP) -0.4988 (-15.35)
05 (LIFE) -0.1718 (-10.43)
06 (ADJ) 0.0809 (15.86)
0Od (°) -1.1307 (-0.92)
01d (D*LTV) -0.0058 (-1.45)
02d (D*LOG(A)) 0.0743 (0.75)
03d (D*TEASER) -0.0321 (-0.44)
0M  (D*CAP) 0.3972 (2.45)
05d (D*LIFE) 0.1506 (1.89)






ML Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
Using Goldfeld and Quandt 
(Unconstrained Model)
[Erate, = fiQ{ + fiu LTV + fi2i LOG (A) + fiZi TEASER + fi.. CAP






/801 (CONSTANT) 10.0145 (140.92)
fi„ (LTV) 0.0099 (10.12)
(LOG (A)) -0.1530 (-14.54)
fin (TEASER) -0.0203 (-1.74)
041 (CAP) -0.4498 (-12.16)
fin (LIFE) -0.2199 (-12.55)
P61 (ADJ) 0.0896 (15.54)
fim (CONSTANT) 10.1437 (28.42)
fin (LTV) 0.0080 (1.61)
fi2Z (LOG(A)) -0.1516 (-2.63)
fiZ2 (TEASER) -0.3587 (-6.38)
0*2 (CAP) -0.6416 (-3.40)
fi52 (LIFE) 0.0763 (1.10)









ML Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
Using Tishler and Zang 
(Unconstrained Model)
[Erate, - 0 . + 0U LTV + 0~. LOG (A) + 03, TEASER + 04, CAP






/301 (CONSTANT) 10.1046 (183.43)
(LTV) 0.0098 (14.12)
021 (LOG (A)) -0.1633 (-23.01)
031 (TEASER) -0.0499 (-5.66)
04, (CAP) -0.4993 (-17.01)
051 (LIFE) -0.1713 (-14.12)
061 (ADJ) 0.0810 (16.53)
0O2 (CONSTANT) 8.9647 (26.90)
012 (LTV) 0.0041 (0.65)
022 (LOG (A)) -0.0888 (-1.34)
032 (TEASER) -0.0816 (-0.96)
042 (CAP) -0.1019 (-0.42)
052 (LIFE) -0.0208 (-0.18)








ML Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
Using Goldfeld and Quandt/Tishler and Zang 
(Constrained Model)
[Erate - 0O + 0, LTV 
+ 05
+ 02 LOG (A) + 0, TEASER + 0, CAP 
















Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
(Testing for Pair Coeffients)
]-3,3[
[Erate - 0. + 0. LTV + 02 LOG (A) + 03 TEASER + 0, CAP
+ 0. LIFE + 0t ADJ]





0Q (CONSTANT) 10.1168 (43.16)
Py (LTV) 0.0100 (13.97)
02 (LOG(A)) -0.1665 (-8.72)
03 (TEASER) -0.0560 (-5.88)
0U (CAP) -0.4890 (-15.00)
0$ (LIFE) -0.1692 (-10.23)
P6 (ADJ) -0.0808 (-15.83)
0Od (°) -1.1205 (-0.92)
01d (D*LTV) -0.0059 (-1.48)
02d (D*IXDG(A) ) 0.0754 (0.76)
0M  (D*TEASER) -0.0259 (-0.35)
0M (D*CAP) 0.3874 ( 2.39)
/S5d (D*LIFE) 0.1479 ( 1.86)





Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
(Testing for Pair Coeffients)
[-4,4[
[Erate = 0 + 0. LTV + fi- LOG (A) + 0, TEASER + CAP
+ 05 LIFE + 06 ADJ]
0 «i D + 1̂d D*LTV + 0M D*LOG(A) + 0M D*TEASER + 04d D*CAP + 05d D*LIFE + 0U D*ADJ]
Variable
Coefficients ParameterEstimates t-Statistic
0Q (CONSTANT) 10.2806 (41.64)
01 (LTV) 0.0101 (13.61)
02 (LOG (A) ) -0.1623 (-8.21)
03 (TEASER) -0.0561 (-5.80)
04 (CAP) -0.4543 (-13.45)
05 (LIFE) -0.2222 (-11.18)
06 (AM) 0.0805 (15.59)
0Od <D> -1.2843 (-1.04)
0 ld (D*LTV) -0.0060 (-1.48)
02d (D*LOG(A) ) 0.0712 (0.71)
0JJ (D*TEASER) -0.0259 (-0.35)
04d (D*CAP) 0.3527 (2.15)
0M  (D*LIFE) 0.2010 (2.47)





Estimated Results for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 
for the Month of May, June, July, 1987 
(Testing for Pair Coeffients)
J-5,5[
[Erate • fi + fi. LTV + fi2 LOG (A) + fi* TEASER + fiu CAP
+ fis LIFE + fi* ADJ]





fiQ (CONSTANT) 10.2561 (40.63)
fiy (LTV) 0.0101 (13.28)
fi2 (LOG(A)) -0.1627 (-8.06)
fi3 (TEASER) -0.0424 (-4.36)
fit, (CAP) -0.4950 (-14.55)
fi5 (LIFE) -0.2101 (-10.36)
fi6 (ADJ) 0.0808 (15.62)
fiM (D) -1.2598 (-1.03)
/31d (D*LTV) -0.0060 (-1.51)
fi2d (D*LOG (A) ) 0.0716 (0.72)
(D*TEASER) -0.0395 (-0.54)
fiM (D*CAP) 0.3934 (2.42)
j8M (D*LIFE) 0.1888 (2.35)






Very little is known about the pricing behavior of 
insolvent lending institutions. This dissertation attempts 
to fill this gap in the literature by examining whether 
failed or failing thrift institutions will take excessive 
risks by underprice their mortgage products. In Chapter II, 
background literature on disparities on the mortgage pricing 
behavior of lending institutions was presented. This 
chapter also briefly reviewed the evidence on well- 
capitalized lending institutions in the presence of 
federally deposit insurance programs. Chapter III examined 
the pricing implications of fixed and adjustable-rate 
mortgages originated by failed or failing saving and loans 
institutions. A two-state contingent-claims model of fixed- 
rate mortgages was developed to illustrate the pricing 
behavior of failed or failing financial institutions. It 
was argued that well-capitalized lending institutions will 
concern themselves with the conditional probability that 
they will remain solvent when pricing their mortgage 
products. Insolvent institutions that have very little 
chance of regaining solvency, however, may not care about 
borrower defaults. These insolvent institutions thereby can 
underprice their loans by offering fixed-rate mortgages at a 
discount relative to the healthy lending institutions. 
Furthermore, insolvent institutions may also offer fixed-
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rate mortgages at a discount as compared to solvent 
institutions by underpricing the interest rate risk. These 
same arguments were also made for adjustable-rate mortgages. 
For example, failed or failing lending institutions may 
offer adjustable-rate mortgages at a discount and/or with a 
tighter interest-rate cap to encourage continued borrowing. 
In Appendix A, the pricing differential between solvent and 
insolvent institutions is further illustrated with a simple 
model, since failed or failing lending institutions use the 
conditional repayment probability, they will rationally 
offer a lower rate on their loan products than would a 
healthy institution making the same loan. Using the 
mortgage interest rate survey data obtained from the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board, the underpricing theory was 
empirically demonstrated. The three tests used in examining 
the proposition were: the Chow, the Goldfeld and Quandt and
the Tishler and Zang tests. These three techniques were 
described in Chapter IV.
The econometric models and the empirical results for 
the case of fixed-rate mortgages were presented in Chapter 
V. This chapter attempted to test whether or not insolvent 
saving and loans institutions offer their fixed-rate loans 
at a discount. The results of the chow test and the 
Goldfeld and Quandt and the Tishler and Zang Maximum 
likelihood optimization techniques were consistent with the 
underpricing theory. In particular, the statistical
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significance of the two differential coefficients, namely 
the coefficient of the difference in the intercept and the 
coefficient of the log of the loan to value ratio, further 
implied that insolvent savings and loan associations 
underprice their fixed-rate mortgages by charging less for 
the default risk than solvent institutions.
The same results were also achieved for the case of 
adjustable-rate mortgages. In all tests the results 
indicate that insolvent savings and loan institutions also 
offer their adjustable rate mortgages at a discount. The 
two variables that failed or failing institutions appear to 
misprice are the periodic rate caps and the adjustment 
periods. Since it is a no loss proposition for these 
insolvent institutions to indulge in excessive risk taking, 
they can offer adjustable-rate mortgages with tighter caps 
and shorter frequencies of adjustment at a lower price.
In summary, the dissertation puts forth two theoretical 
arguments for the underpricing proposition for insolvent 
savings and loan institutions. The arguments are that (1) a 
failed or failing lending institution uses the conditional 
repayment probability in setting credit rates on mortgage 
loans, and (2) failed or failing lending institutions do not 
consider capital losses from adverse changes in interest 
rates in charging for interest-rate risk. Therefore, a 
failed or failing lending institution will rationally offer 
a lower rate on mortgages than would a well-capitalized
118
lending institution making the same loan. The underpricing 
theory is demonstrated empirically using the mortgage 
interest rate survey data obtained from the Federal Home 
Loan Bank board. In light of the empirical results, it is 
concluded that, indeed, insolvent savings and loan 
institutions do underprice their fixed and adjustable-rate 
mortgages.
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Appendix a
Modeling the Behavior of veiled or Veiling Lending Institutions
This appendix presents a simple model of failed and
failing lending institutions. In particular, the model
shows that failed or failing lending institution will
rationally offer a lower contractual interest rate on
mortgages than would a well-capital!zed lending institution
making the same loan*
It is assumed that a representative lending institution
receives funds from several sources, namely the equity
capital, and deposits. The equity capital includes the
initial investment by stockholders and retained earnings.
The third source of operating funds is deposit accounts.
This public borrowing is perhaps the most important debt
instrument for the typical lending institution. The
representative lending institution uses these sources of
operating funds to offer mortgages and invest in riskfree
securities.
A.l The Model Vramework
The framework used in the model is a one-period with 
the following assumptions:
A(l) The typical lending institution association 
maximizes its net present value. For the one-period model, 
the lending institution in effect maximizes its net end of
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period value by choosing the appropriate loan and credit 
rates.
A (2) The typical lending institution's asset portfolio 
consists mainly of loans and riskless securities. It is 
assumed, therefore, that the revenue of the thrift is 
derived from the income of these earning assets.
A(3) The institution is a price-setter in its loan 
markets. Let H be the function representing mortgage loans 
which can be expressed as:
M - "(r^rU
where
rffl = competing rate in the market




This specification assumes that the value of loans is 
only a function of the competing market and the offering 
rate. The lending institution is, therefore, a price-setter 
in the loan markets.
A(4) In addition to mortgages, the remaining funds are 
assumed to be invested in assets such as Treasury bills. 
These assets are considered to be free of risks and their 
supply is perfectly elastic to the typical lending
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institution, in reality, a lending institution also holds 
some reserve cash balances to meet expected and unexpected 
deposit withdrawals. The inclusion of the cash balance 
component in the representative lending institution balance 
sheet will not change the result of the model. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that government securities are liquid and can 
be sold rather quickly in case of unexpected demand for 
cash. Therefore, the holding of cash reserve is not 
critically needed. Since the timing of the liquidation and 
the market return of these investment assets are arbitrary 
and not under the control of the lending institution, the 
investment function, I *= I(rf) is only a function of the 
rate of return on investment, r{. The expected rate of 
return of these assets are assuned to be exogenous to the 
model.
A (5) Equity capital and saving deposits are assumed to 
be the only sources of funds for the lending institution.
A(6) Deposits represent an important source of 
operating funds for the savings and loan institutions. Even 
though, there are several classifications of deposit 
accounts in real life, the model assumes only one type of 
savings deposits for simplicity. It is assumed that the 
typical savings and loan is a price setter in its deposit 
markets. The savings deposit function, S, is of the 
following form:
s * s <rcd'rod>
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where is the competing rate in the deposit markets and 




This specification assumes that the saving deposits 
function does not depend on the expected return on deposits, 
since all deposit account in the typical savings and loan 
association is federally guaranteed. Instead, the saving 
deposit supply function depends on the offering rate on 
savings deposit accounts in the presence of federally 
protected insurance mechanism.
A(7) The Equity Capital position, E, of the 
institution is represented by:
E = E(re)
where, re = rate of return on equity capital.
The equity capital of a lending institution represents 
an important component of the liability side of the balance 
sheet. For ease of exposition, it is assumed that returns 
on these capital account are exogenously given.
A.2 The Objective Expected Value Function
129
Given the framework of model, the lending institution 
derived profits come from the differential between earning 
assets revenue and cost of operating funds. The lending 
institution chooses deposit and loan rates to maximize its 
expected end of period net value.
The lending institution allocates its total operating 
funds between its loan portfolio and riskless investment.
Let Y represent the total assets of the thrift institution:
Y * mY+iY
where
mY = amount of total assets in loans 





In addition, the typical lending institution source of 
funds are from equity capital, E, and public debts through 
savings deposit accounts, S. It can be summarized as 
followed:
Y - E + S
The expected net value at the end of the period is the 
sum of the net value if the loan is repaid, and the net










- (1+r*) S (rcd, r^)) f (v) dv




v= asset value with probability density 
function f(v) and cumulative 
function F(v) defined over the range
Substituting the constraint equation into (1) we get:
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The last term In the above equation represents the cost of 
borrower's eventual default and agency costs associated with 
the lending institution's eventual bankrupcy.
A.3 Optimisation Solution
Given the expected net value, the problem can be solved 
by partially differentiating the objective function with 
respect to the endogenous variables of the model. The 
result is the necessary conditions for maximizing behaviors 
of the lending institution. It objective function can now 
be formally stated as follows:
Max (ro*"r?)M ( rom>+ (rr rod)s (rcd» rod>
6
+ (rf-r,)E(re)-[F(v)dv (3)
Partially differentiating the objective net expected 
value function with respect to rOT yields:
SE (V)
 *=M (r̂ , r,J + (r̂ -r,) {SM(r̂ , r^/Sr^)6r_
"("Ir^irJ + ll+rJ 
(SM(rCTI,r0il)/6r0|1,))F(A) (4)
also,
fiE(v)---- =r, (<5S (rcd, r^)/ Sr^)
5rod
-r^ (tfS (rcd, r^/Sr^) -S (rcd, r^)




P(B) + (r„-r.) («JM(r„,r1.)/«r20.)
+2(«M(r ,r_>/«r„) (6)





“T  = (r,-rod) ( 52s (redr r^j)/SrZod
fir2od
(7)
Given the specification of the lending institution's 
savings deposit functions, the above equation will always be 
less than zero.
A.4 The Solution
Proposition: If it is assumed that the
probability that a lending institution is solvent 
should borrowers default equals zero. It follows 
that under these conditions a lending institution 
will not be concerned with pricing default risk. 
Moreover, the rate charged by well-capitalized 
institutions (r̂ ) vi.ll exceed the rate charged by 
failed or failing lending institutions (r̂ ) by fi, 
where fi = F*(B) (1-r,)/(1-F*(B))>0
Proof: From the first order condition the following
expression is obtained:
V < * < r - ,r<_><F<B>-l) + <«M(r- ,r„1>/*r.1)
(F(B)+r,)) ((4M(re.,r„)/«r-)(l-F(B)))-' (8)
Let the superscript s denote a well-capitalized or 
solvent lending institution. Further, assume that for well-
134
capitalized institutions, the probability of remaining 
solvent is virtually one. Hence, the conditional 
probability of repayment is equal to the unconditional 
probability of repayment. It follows that for these 
institutions, the offering rate on the mortgage will equal:
+ (iM(rc|n,rom)/5reni) (F‘(B)+r,))
((«M(rcni,r0J/*rom) (l-F’fB)))'1 (9)
Next, denote a failed or failing lending institution by 
the superscript i. Assume that the probability of 
bankruptcy and the probability that any particular loan in 
its portfolio defaults are not independent. Assume that 
both events depend on the state of the local economy. Under 
these assumptions, the lending institution can survive only 
if local property values do well. If this happens then all 
mortgage loans will be repaid. From equation (8) and (9), 
it follows that
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r V rf« = ( * M (ra.'r« > / firc.> (F-W-r’WHl-r,)
+ ((^(r^rj/irj (F» (B)+r,)))) '1+1 (10)
Since F*(£) - F1 (/3) > 0, then the first term on the 
right hand side of equation (10) is unambiguously positive. 
Given that the probability that a failed or failing lending 




H=F8 (B) (1-r,) (1-F*(B)) 'Vo
Equation (11) suggests that r^ > r^. That is, rates 
charged by solvent or well-capitalized lending institutions 
will exceed the rate charged borrowers by failed or failing 
lending institutions. QED.
A.4. Conclusions
The differential pricing mechanism between solvent and 
insolvent lending institutions is largely dependent upon the 
probability that the institution will remain solvent in
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future periods. This probability is conditional on the 
lending institution's current financial condition. This 
approach has not been used in the determination of loans 
rates. The healthier the lending institution's at the 
present time, the less likely it will be bankrupted in the 
future periods, and vice versa. Hence, the probability of a 
loan default conditional on a failed or failing lending 
institution avoiding bankruptcy is lower than the 
unconditional probability that the same loan will default. 
Since the failed or failing lending institution uses the 
conditional repayment probability in setting credit rates, 
it will use a higher repayment probability than does a 
solvent lending institution. As the result, the failed or 
failing lending institution will rationally offers a lower 
contractual interest rate on mortgages than would a well- 
capitalized lending institution making the same loan.
Appendix B
In obtaining the value of the mortgage, the fundamental 
valuation equation is used with appropriate boundary and 
initial conditions. There are infinite combinations of H, 
r, t, which satisfy the fundamental partial differential 
equation. And since there is no closed-form solution to the 
equation, boundary conditions are needed for a numerical 
solution.
In general, boundary conditions fall into two 
categories. The first type is commonly known as the 
terminal conditions and relates to the time to maturity of 
the contract. For a fully-amortizing mortgage, its value at 
the time of maturity, T, is equal to zero, i.e. V(H,r,T) =
0. While the terminal boundary condition for a non­
amortizing mortgage is its par value. The second category 
of boundary conditions describe the value of assets at limit 
values of state variables, namely the spot rate of interest 
and the house prices, each approaches infinity or zero.
The model assumes that the default on the mortgage 
occurs at the time of required payment. The borrower will 
exercise this option only if the value of the mortgaged 
property is less than the sum of the value of the mortgage 
after making the debt service payment and the amount of 
payment. On the other hand, the option to prepay the 
mortgage can occur at any time. The borrower will prepay
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the loan if the current mortgage value exceeds the unpaid 
balance less any other costs such as prepayment penalties or 
refinancing costs.
At the time of maturity, n, the value of the 
prepayment is zero. The borrower only has the option to 
default on the mortgage, since at the maturity there is 
only one single payment, m, that needs to be made. The 
borrower exercises the default option only if the value of 
the mortgaged property, H, is less than the debt service 
amount.




P(r(n),n) * 0 and 
V(r(n),n) * min[M,H(r(n)]
where,
M: the mortgage payment where
(a/12)L 
1 - [ (l/(l+a/12) )n]
U(i): unpaid mortgage after the payment date i is made
[(1+ a/12)n - (1 + a/12)f]L
U(i)---------------------------(1 + a/12)n - 1 
L: the original mortgage amount
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a: the annual contract rate
n: the term of the loan in months
r (1): the calendar time of the ith month
r(i) - i/12
S(r,t): the value of the remaining payment stream at
time t
D(H,r,t): the value of the default option at time t 
P(H,r,t): the value of the prepayment option at time 
t
V(H,r,t) = S(r,t) - D(H,r,t) - P(H,r,t) where V(H,r,t) 
is the value of the mortgage to the lender 
at time t
The other category of boundary conditions involves 
extreme values of the state variables. As the value of the 
house reaches zero, the borrower certainly will default on 
the mortgage. The value of the prepayment option will be 
zero and so is the value of the mortgage.
P(0,r) * 0 
D(0,r) = S(r)
V(0,r) « 0
As the value of the property approaches infinity, the
default option has no value.
lim D(H,r) » 0 
H -* «o
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lim V(H,r) - S(r) - Lim P(H,r)H -+ <» H -+ oo
As the spot rate approaches zero the value of the
mortgage satisfies the following partial differential
equation:
*sah2H2 (3zV/3H2) - sH(3V/dH) + dH/dt =0
Finally, as the spot rate approaches infinity, the value of 
mortgage approaches zero.
lim S(r) = 0 r -* co
lim P(H,r) = 0 r -*■ oo
lim D(H,r) = 0r -+ oo
lim V(H,r) - 0 
r *♦ oo
Appendix C
THE INSTITUTIONAL PICTURE OF MORTGAGES
The purpose of this appendix is to survey the 
institutional aspects of mortgages. Section c . l  begins with 
a short history of mortgage lending in the United States. 
Section C.2 follows with a discussion of the institutions 
which participate in mortgage originations and those which 
are active in the secondary market. Section C.3 briefly 
discusses various types of mortgages. Finally, section C.4 
concludes with a survey of the various types instruments 
available in both the primary and secondary mortgage market.
C.l A Brief History of Mortgage Lending
The first institutions to provide a means of obtaining 
mortgage loans were the building and loan associations which 
began in 1831 and flourished with the economic expansion of 
the 1840's. Prior to the early 1900's, mortgages are mostly 
non-amortized with short maturities and low loan-to-value 
ratio. Between 1900 and the late 1920's, the U.S. economy 
flourished as did the market for mortgages. Building and 
loan associations, savings and loan associations, mutual 
savings banks, and trust companies were the major suppliers 
of funds to the mortgage market.
Prior to 1930, there were five types of mortgage 
lenders: mortgage brokers, mortgage loan companies, savings
141
142
and loans, building and loans and mortgage guarantee 
companies. During the ten years after the onset of the 
Great Depression, mortgages guarantee companies had 
collapsed with the real estate market and ceased to exist; 
42% of the savings and loans (12,000) and 33% of the 
commercial banks either merged or went bankrupt. In 
response, several entities were created: (1) the Federal 
Housing Administration (1934) whose purpose was to insure 
mortgages in order to stimulate the construction of 
residential housing; (2) the Federal Home Loan Bank System 
(1932) which was created to be a central reserve credit 
system for financial intermediaries active in housing 
finance; (3) the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation, which insured the deposits of member thrifts; 
and (4) the Home Owners loan Corporation (1933) which, for 
the three years of its existence, bought the frozen 
mortgages of the thrifts for 80% of par value in exchange 
for 2.25% federally-guaranteed debentures which were easily 
traded for cash. The Home Owner Loan Corporation was the 
most critical in reversing the mortgage credit and housing 
crunch of the 1930's.
Saving and loans responded to the collapse by limiting 
loan-to-value ratios to a maximum of 60% of appraised value 
and time until maturity to three years. It was the building 
and loans associations who responded with the now 
institutional feature of mortgages --  amortization. In
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addition, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) 
was established in 1938 to buy and sell FHA-insured 
mortgages.
At the end of World War II, financial institutions were 
extremely liquid due to a large extent, to the policy of the 
Federal Reserve System of fixing the price of government 
securities so that their yields were at least 2% below that 
of mortgages. At the same time, returning veterans increased 
the need for both mortgage credit and housing construction. 
In 1944, the Serviceman's Re-adjustment Act empowered the 
Veterans Administration to guarantee loans made to veterans 
obtained through private lenders. The first loans, under the 
Act, were for a maximum principal of $2000, a maximum loan- 
to-value ratio of 50%, and an interest rate of 4%. By 1950, 
the par value was raised to $7500 and the loan-to-value 
ratio to 60%. Also, after World War II, ten-year fully- 
amortized conventional loans, which had replaced the three 
and four-year loans, were gradually replaced by twenty-year 
loans.
By 1950, housing starts were a record 1.4 million 
units. This figure is double that of 1941 and almost ten 
times the number for the year 1944. This period of 
expansion continued well into the 1960's and was the 
successful result of both the 'baby boom* and the policies 
of the VA and FHA.
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By the end of 1954, nearly 25% of the VA-guaranteed 
loans closed had no downpayments and thirty years until 
maturity. By 1960, 60% of VA-guaranteed loans had no 
downpayment and 76% had maturities of twenty-six to thirty 
years. These figures rose to 70% and 90%, respectively by 
1970.
With the expansion of FNMA to buy and sell VA- 
guaranteed loans, a whole new source of funds for the 
mortgage market is opened up. This was the beginning of the 
expansion of today's secondary markets.
C.2 The capital Markets
C.2.1 Mortgage Financing and Financial Intermediaries
Depository institutions in the United States has been 
characterized by a dual system. On the primary level, 
federal savings and loans are chartered by the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and are insured by the now defunct 
FSLIC, whereas state-chartered savings and loans are 
chartered by state boards and are subject to state 
regulations. Thrift institutions were born to obtain 
savings from the public and invest most of those funds in 
home financing. Today, thrift institutions invest a large 
percentage of their assets in conventional mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities.
Commercial banks have been the largest financial 
intermediary since 1920, but mortgage banking has
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historically been a small part of their business. Today, 
these institutions, hold almost 30% of all conventional 
mortgage debt outstanding. The act was revolutionary for 
the mortgage market because it broadened the availability.
C.2.2 Federal Agencies
The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) was 
born in 1938 with the purpose of creating a secondary market 
in FHA-insured loans financed by borrowing from the U.S. 
Treasury. At inception, FNMA was wholly owned by the U.S. 
Government but in 1954, FNMA was reorganized to be partly 
government-owned and partly privately-owned and charged with 
three functions: managing, servicing, and liquidation of its 
existing portfolio; providing assistance for special 
housing programs; and the secondary market operations. FNMA 
later became a private corporation in charge of the 
secondary market operations. The Guaranteed National 
Mortgage Association (GNMA) emerged as a government agency 
responsible for the first two functions.
Historically, FNMA has served to stem the imbalance in 
the residential mortgage market during periods of 
disintermediation caused by rising interest rates (i.e. 
1969-70, 1973-4, 1979-80, and 1981-3). For example, during 
the housing crunch of 1969-70, FNMA's purchase activities 
accounted for almost half of the increase in home mortgage 
loans made between the third quarter of 1969 and the first
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quarter of 1970. Since 1970, FNMA has been authorized to 
purchase conventional mortgages which are not FHA-insured or 
VA-guaranteed. FNMA instituted the Free Market System 
commitment auction in 1968.w
GNMA was created in 1968 to take over the role of 
buying VA-guaranteed and FHA-insured mortgages. The Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ('Freddie Mac* or FHLMC), 
started in 1970 as part of the Federal Home Loan Bank, is 
the third largest agency active in the secondary mortgage 
market. Its purpose is to support the conventional mortgage 
market by acting as guarantor of mortgage-backed securities 
sold in the secondary market. 'Freddie Mac' was the first 
institution to offer participation in pools composed of 
conventional mortgages (1971). It instituted the 
standardization of loan applications (1973) and, two years 
later, standardized mortgage contracts; both of which serve 
to increase liquidity in the secondary market. "Freddie 
Mac" is currently responsible for a large portion of the 
outstanding agency pass-through securities.
C.2.3 Private Companies
14Every other Monday, those wishing to sell loans submit 
bids which specify the yields the FNMA would receive if it 
bought them. After reviewing mortgage and credit market 
conditions, FNMA determines the lowest acceptable yields and 
issues six-month commitments to buy mortgages to the 
successful bidders in exchange for commitment fees. The 
commitments are put options for the mortgagees and, if rates 
drop during the commitment period, sellers are able to obtain 
a better price from another investor.
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In addition to federal agencies, life insurance 
companies, mortgage companies also are active in the 
mortgage markets. Mortgage companies have acted both as 
brokers between individual borrowers and lenders and added 
their own funds through debentures collateralized by 
mortgages since the mid-1850's. By the mid-1960's, mortgage 
companies were servicing 20% of all residential mortgages 
and more than 50% of all FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed 
residential Loans. While mainly servicers of mortgages, 
they do originate FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans for 
the purpose of placing them in pools funded by the sale of 
GNMA's. Today, mortgage companies buy and sell loans to 
institutions and financial intermediaries, many of which are 
originated by the mortgage company itself. They still play 
an important role linking the primary and secondary markets. 
Mortgage companies, for the most part, do not maintain 
inventories of loans and are the primary users of FNMA's 
auction program, typically accounting for more than 80% of 
FNMA's purchases.
C.2.4 Mortgage Insurers
The Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans 
Administration are the government agencies responsible for 
insuring mortgages in the primary market. Together they 
insure about one-third of the residential mortgage debt 
outstanding. Another third is at least partially insured by
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the private mortgage industry which started in 1956. 
Previously, private mortgage insurance was prohibited by 




Fixed-rate mortgages have a fixed interest rate and 
monthly payment over its term of maturity. The early 
payments are mostly interest and slowly become increasingly 
composed of principal. Fixed-rate mortgages are the most 
common type of loan and have typical maturities of thirty 
years. Given the traditional imbalance in the 
asset/liability maturity structure of thrift institutions, 
more institutional lenders are now offering fixed-rate loans 
with fifteen-year terms.
c.3.2 Adj ustable-Rate Montages
Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) are the most popular 
alternative to the traditional fixed-rate loan. ARM's have, 
as the name implies, an adjustable interest rate, and is 
usually tied to some financial index. Common indices in use 
are: the rate on 6-month Treasury-bills or 3-year Treasury
notes; the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's national average 
contract rate; and the average cost of funds for federally- 
insured savings and loans. ARMs grew in popularity as a
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solution the thrift industry's liquidity crisis of the early 
1980's. ASMs are characterized by interest rate caps. A 
periodic cap limits the size of the change the loan will 
take at each step. An life of loan cap sets a limit on the 
amount the rate may change over the life of the loan. A few 
ARMs also have payment caps which limit the maximum monthly 
payment.15
C.3.3 Balloon Mortgages
Balloon mortgages are similar to fixed-rate loans in 
that both the loan rate and the coupon payment are fixed; 
the difference is that the final payment on a balloon 
mortgage is quite large. In some cases, balloons take the 
form of bonds where the first through next-to-last payments 
are only interest, and the final one is the entire 
principal. Balloon mortgages are usually short-term and 
constitute a small percentage of all mortgages.
C.3.4 Graduated-Payment Mortgages
Graduated-payment mortgages (GPM's) are loans whose 
monthly charges are scheduled to rise during their lives. 
These loans are initiated on the assumption that the 
borrower's income will also rise over time. In the 
beginning, these payments are relatively low either because 
the loan rate will rise or because it is fixed and payments
15if a payment cap is triggered, negative amortization occurs.
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either include little or nor principal or they amortize 
negatively. Payments gradually rise to a fixed level and 
remain their until the loan is repaid. GPM's have been 
popular with builders who want to sell new homes quickly and 
induce borrowers to buy with lower early payments.
c.3.5 other Mortgages
In addition, there are Growing-Equity Mortgages (GEMs) 
and Shared-Appreciation Mortgages (SAMs). GEMs are a recent 
innovation in the mortgage market and blend a variable 
monthly payment schedule with a fixed-loan rate. Changes in 
the monthly coupon reflect decreases in the amount of 
principal remaining so that the mortgage is usually paid off 
long before the contractual terms. SAMs allow lender to 
receive a percentage of the appreciation in the house in 
exchange for a lower contractual rate of interest.
C.4 Mortgage-Related Securities 
C.4.1 Mortgage Pass-Throughs
A mortgage pass-through security is created when a 
number of mortgages are pooled together to sell to 
investors. Cashflows from the pool are passed along to 
investors in proportion to their share of the pool. The 
first pass-throughs were sold by GNMA in 1970 and were 
backed by FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans. GNMA is 
still the dominant agency-issuer of pass-throughs. GNMA
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securities are backed by loans originated by mortgage banks, 
thrift institutions, and commercial banks.
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporations was founded 
in 1970 to create pass-throughs using mortgages originated 
by an FHLB bank or FSLIC member, or any financial 
intermediary whose liabilities are insured by a Federal 
agency. Freddie Mac is the second largest issuer of agency 
pass-throughs and was the first to offer pools composed of 
conventional mortgages.
The other federal issuer is FNMA which sells mortgages 
originated by mortgage banks and thrift institutions. FNMA 
also acts as servicer. Freddie Mac insures the timely 
payment of interest (principal within one year) and FNMA 
insures the timely payment of both interest and principal. 
Both agencies also require additional private mortgage 
insurance if the initial loan-to-value ratio is greater then 
80% of the appraised value; the insurance must be sufficient 
to reduce the liability to 75%. In addition, both issue 
pass-throughs. In order to insure that the interest on the 
underlying mortgages is sufficient to meet the coupon on the 
pass-through, FNMA requires the underlying loan rates to be 
between 50 and 250 basis points greater than the coupon on 
the pass-through. FNMA retains 25 basis points of interest 
per month on the amount of principal remaining as its fee 
for guaranteeing the mortgage. The difference between the
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interest collected less the coupon owed and FNMA1s fee goes 
to the servicer.
In addition to agency-issued pas-throughs, privately- 
issued pass-throughs have existed since the late 1970's.
The private pass-throughs are not a debt of the issuer and 
the underlying mortgages are placed in the possession of a 
trustee. The issuer services the debt for a fee and often 
serves as the guarantor. The advantage to the issuer is the 
opportunity to remove assets from the balance sheet while 
earning income through the servicing fee. The market in 
privately-issued pass-throughs is small relative to that of 
agency-issued pools.
C.4.2 Mortgage-Backed and Mortgage Fay-Through Bonds
Bonds backed by various mortgage instruments have been 
issued since 1975 through the market is relatively small at 
the present time. Mortgage-backed bonds have the same 
characteristics as most corporate bonds, except that their 
cashflows depends on the cashflows of the underlying pool of 
mortgages. They differ from pass-throughs in that the 
cashflows on mortgage-backed bonds are fixed and 
predetermined. The collateral used for these bonds can be 
either GNMA's, FNMA's, Freddie Mac's. The bond issuer has 
title to the underlying mortgages, though they are placed 
with a trustee, and retains all cashflows while making the 
necessary payments to the bondholders. The bondholders have
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title to the bonds, but not the collateral. Consequently, 
the bonds, like corporate and U.S. Treasury issues, are 
general obligations of the issuer. The timing and the 
pattern of the cashflows of the bonds are differed from that 
of the underlying mortgages. In order to protect the 
interests of the investor, the collateral is marked to the 
market regularly and replenished according to the market 
value rule.16
Pay-through bonds are similar to pass-throughs. Their 
cashflows are linked to the cashflows of the collateral.
Like mortgage-backed bonds, pay-through bonds are a general 
obligation of the issuer and the investor has title to the 
bonds, there is also rule with regards to the amount of 
collateral to the amount of bonds (par value) which can be 
issued.17
c.4.3 Collateralised Mortgage Obligations (CMOs)
CMOs are multi-tranches pay-through bonds with tranches 
having a fixed coupon and a stated maturity (like pools).
16The market value of the collateral must be sufficient 
to redeem the bonds at par plus interest at each interval. If 
the market value is less than necessary, the issuer must add 
collateral accordingly. When the issuer allows the market 
value of the collateral to fall below the necessary level of 
the issuer defaults, the trustee takes over and sells the 
collateral in order to redeem the bonds. The general result 
is that mortgage backed bonds require over-collateralization 
between 125% to 240% of the par value of the bonds.
17The principal plus interest on the collateral must be 
at least as great as the principal plus interest on the bonds.
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Most CMO's have four tranches often with a zero coupon bond 
as the last tranche. Cashflows are prioritized so that all 
tranches with the exception of the last class, receive 
interest payments first, and then any remaining collateral 
cashflow goes towards the repayment of principal on the 
first tranche until it is retired, and then toward the 
second tranche until it is paid off, and so on. After the 
next-to-last tranche is retired, the s-tranche receives all 
remaining cashflows until its accrued interest and principal 
are paid off. Since the z~tranche has no interim cashflows 
until all the other classes are retired, its presence serves 
to accelerate the rate at which the others are retired. Any 
excess cashflows are retained by the issuer. CMOs have the 
problems of reinvestment risk and risk that the collateral 
will be insufficient to meet the necessary cashflows of the 
bonds, given the uncertainty of the pattern of underlying 
cashflows. The reinvestment risk occurs because the 
mismatch in timing between collateral payments and the bonds 
payments. For the highest grade, rating agencies require a 
conservative reinvestment rate of 3% per annum for all 
future cashflows and, likewise, conservative estimates on 
future prepayments in determining the degree of 
overcollateralization.18 CMOs have become popular since
18The rule is that the par value of bonds which can be 
guaranteed by the collateral is equal to the present value of 
the cashflows of the collateral discounted by the highest 
coupon of the CMO tranches or the par value of the collateral, 
whichever is less.
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the different tranches allow for indifferent risk and time 
preferences and still have a yield premium over treasuries. 
The early tranches minimal exposure to interest rate risk 
while the longer tranches appeal to investors who want less 
reinvestment risk.
Apptndlx D
Models of the Savings and Loan InstitutionI A Review
A substantial body of research has attempted to model 
and explain the behavior of lending institution. Santomero 
(1984) provides a good survey of the literature. The 
overall view of a financial institution can be represented 
by the following objective function.
Max E[V (Wt+T) ] (1)
subject to wt+T = wt (i+nt+1) (i+nt+2) . . .  (i+nt+T)
^t*k = (S Jr AA l “  2 jr OD J "  c (A f»D j) ) / W t+k-i
where,
V(.)= the objective function with 
fiV/«Wt+T>0 and 62V/6Wl+r <o 
Wt+T = terminal wealth value at the horizon 
time r
Ht+k = the random profit per unit of capital 
during period t+k, o<k<r 
rA = the random return of asset A, 
rD = the random cost of deposit Dj 
c(.) = the operating cost function
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Using of this approach includes models by Porter 
(1961), Klein (1972), Goldfeld and Jaffee (1970), Sealey 
(1980) and Flannery (1982).
In addition to the overall approach, the modelling of a 
depository institution can be viewed from assets, liability 
or both sides of the balance sheet. Asset allocation models 
are of two types, namely, reserve management and portfolio 
choice models of asset allocation.
For an institution with earning asset A, yielding rA 
and reserves R must maximize the following function in order 
to maximize expected profit from deposit balances.
II - rA(D-R) - Jc(X-R) f(x)dx (2)
where x represents the net withdrawals with density function 
f(x) and c is the proportional cost to obtain additional 
funds if x>R.
The basic result in reserve management model is that 
the expected reduction in reserve adjustments cost, on the 
margin, must be the same as the opportunity cost of 
reserves:
rA - cjf (x)dx (3)
Reserve management models includes Poole (1968), 
Baltensperger (1974) and Baltensperger and Hellmuth (1976).
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Portfolio choice models of asset allocation determine an 
optimal asset size for an profit maximization firm. Shull 
(1963),Klein(1971), Pyle(1971), Hart and Jaffee (1974) and 
Sealey (1980) are typical of this approach, that is
Max n - 2,rAA, “ sjrDDj (4)
Intertemporal model is also presented by Wood (1974)
where the objective function is a multiperiod discounted 
valuation function.
Maxr r n = (5)
As for the liability choice models the profit function
can be generally written as:
E * S^A, - [(Cj - kj)nj(Dj) ] (6)
where n is the number of deposit account transactions at the 
cost c and service charge k per transaction.
Alternatively, the analysis of depository institutions 
considers the entire portfolio choice problem. Studies such 
as Klein (1971), Deshmukh, et al. (1983) and Santomero 
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